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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW 
Between 1949 and 1999, and particularly after 1971, the U.S. agricultural policy 
changed 180 degrees. Why? There is no shortage of models attempting to explain the 
workings of policymaking. For the most part, these models fall into two broad, general, 
categories: pluralist or elitist. Models, just as with political theories, begin with a set of 
assumptions and structure their argument from there. The argument between various 
pluralist models, for example, begins with the assumption that policy is set at the elected 
level and that officials listen to groups within their constituencies (because it is important 
to our form of government). From this point, pluralists select narrowly defined issues 
and look for ways to explain the policy outcomes by examining the groups of constituents 
attempting to influence the policy outcome. These models additionally make the 
assumption that people act in their own self-interest and, as such, will be politically active 
when motivated to be so, "morphing"' into various coalitions (like the globules in a lava 
lamp forming and reforming) for purposes of lobbying for their interests. Pluralists do 
little to explain the thinking of the various groups identified as lobbyists, possibly under 
the assumption that they are acting in their own self interests, but also because they 
contend it is difficult to quantify. 
Elitist modelers insist there is a broader perspective to policy making that 
pluralists are overlooking. One only has to go back to the time of the Enlightenment to 
recognize that only certain groups of people are involved in writing about, and 
promoting, policy. Such groups have typically been grouped as elite simply because their 
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education and/or resources put them in a position of influence. It was during this time of 
Enlightenment that writings appeared with theories combining ideology, politics, and 
economics (particularly the newly-developing capitalism). Some of these writers are 
cited today as influences on American Founding Fathers. As such, some of these ideas 
are promoted and carried forward in the U.S. education system. Counter writings, such 
as the Catholic Counter Reformation, are not taught in the American public school 
system. Thus, the acronym WASP (White Anglo Saxon Protestant) as an identifier for 
the majority of American political elite has a basis in history. While this has tended to 
promote the idea of homogenism of goals, thus possibly supporting a basis for pluralist 
modelers, elitist modelers insist there is more diversity to Americans that is not being 
identified by the narrow pluralist areas of research. (Herbert McClosky and John Zaller, 
The American Ethos: Public Attitudes towards Capitalism and Democracy, 1984, 1) 
McClosky and Zaller go on to say, on page 194 and 195, that during the late eighteenth 
century (when our American Founders were grappling with how to structure a new type 
of government and relying on ideas of Enlightenment writers) the idea of democracy ( on 
which pluralists base their models) was not generally supported because the idea of mob 
freedom scared many. Therefore, the Founders recognized the existence of an elite, 
Thomas R. Dye refers to in his elitist model. Policy debates between the Founders 
focused on the distribution of political power, with interpretation today often lost as to 
this issue. (McClosky and Zaller, 195-6) 
An ongoing debate over proper farm policy goes back to the beginnings of our 
constitutional government, as identified by the writings of our Founders (Federalists 
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versus Anti-Federalists). Further, the ideological roots ofthis debate can be traced 
through some of the ideologies of the Enlightenment as they were applied to each current 
situation, including the development of capitalism and its relationship to political, 
economic, and social structures and activities. 
Basic to this debate is how individuals are educated to think. By including higher 
level educators as lower elites, McClosky, Zaller, and Dye indicate that this group exerts 
some influence on individuals through the system of education. Underlying assumptions 
and values have been instilled in them through the form of their education and cultural 
development. In addition to the formation of the structure to process information, 
sources of information available to process through the structure for positions on issues is 
important. Individuals become predisposed toward some form of thought structure. John 
Zaller addresses this specifically in his book by describing opinion as the "marriage of 
information and predisposition." (Zaller, The Nature and Origins of Mass Opinion, 1992, 
6) Therefore, both elitist and pluralist models are really dealing with the influences of 
ideologies, as these play out in actions to influence policy decisions over time, but only 
the elitist modeler is attempting to identify these underlying assumptions and values. The 
assumption of pluralist modelers that individuals always act in their own self interests 
represents the value judgment of the modelers themselves, thus tainting their work for 
those times when they are really dealing with subjects who possess different underlying 
assumptions and values. 
In addition to the influences over thought processes, John Gaven~ in his Power 
and Powerlessness, has provided research to show that there are power relationships 
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present that could work to prevent some people from being politically active to benefit 
themselves if they perceive that there will be large negative consequences for them that 
they do not want to face. An example of this might be workers trying to form unions. At 
one time, particularly during the age of industrialism in the late nineteenth century, there 
were job disincentives that worked to discourage union organizing. There could also be 
social consequences in addition to economic circumstances that would work to limit 
political involvement by some groups if they do not want, or find it too harmful, to deal 
with the consequences of their political actions. Gaventa chides pluralist modelers for 
being too narrow in their focus. Pluralist modelers need to do more to take these power 
relationships into account with their models in order to better argue their conclusions. 
This paper is going to examine the restructuring of American agriculture during 
the 1980s by briefly looking at the historical changes in underlying assumptions for 
agricultural policy, and the specific changes that occurred to move farm policy away 
from the permanent legislation (enacted in 1938) to the free trade position of today. 
Three pluralist models will be presented and critiqued for their shortcomings to include a 
broader range of"puzzle pieces''. A new elitist model will be used that combines the 
discussions of McClosky and Zaller as to the factors that form public opinion, the 
contributions of Thomas R. Dye for quantification of data through a demonstration of 
control of resources in significant areas to influence policy (in a manner similar to the 
time of the Enlightenment), and the application of these ideas to agricultural policy 
formation by an author with 30 years of practical working experience in the area of 
agricultural finance and farm lobbying at the congressional level. 
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If someone is attempting to put together a jigsaw puzzle without using the picture 
that always accompanies puzzles (reflecting the final outcome), drawing conclusions 
from a few of the pieces can possibly lead to a different conclusion regarding the end 
picture than if one waits until more of the pieces can be fit together. Explaining a model 
outcome can work the same way. Of course it is possible to selectively use some pieces 
of information in order to assert an opinion as to why an outcome occurred. Sometimes 
when additional pieces of information are used, rather than being ignored ( as not 
important to the argument) then the conclusion might change. By applying the work of 
Zaller and McClosky, Dye, and Gaventa elitist models, this paper will look at more of the 
known events involved in the restructuring of agriculture through the changing of 
underlying policy assumptions and try to provide an explanation that goes beyond the 
pluralist model focus on congressional actions. 
The Zaller elitist model 
Assumptions of this elitist model include influences that form the structure of 
thought processes of individuals, leading to the manner in which information is 
processed: accepted, rejected, and, possibly, positions changed over time. According to 
Zaller' s elitist model, the above influences both help to form an underlying ideological 
basis within individuals (with values, assumptions and priorities) as well as the available 
information accessible by individuals. In addition to these influences, life experiences 
serve to solidify positions on issues: positive, negative, or neutral. In a study that was 
published in 1991, John Zaller examined the media content of Vietnam War reporting 
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over time to see if there was a correlation between change in position by the media and 
societal elite, who were teaching and speaking publicly on the issue, and change in 
position of public opinion, as identified by polls and number of demonstrations. His 
work concluded such a correlation could be quantitatively shown. (John Zaller, 
"Information, Values, and Opinion" American Political Science Review Vol. 85 No. 4 
December 1991, 1215-1237) 
An example (not cited by Zaller but used in cultural history classes) of when this 
type of manipulation was provably attempted in U.S. history was during World War I, 
when the Committee for Public Information (the CPI) was formed by the government, 
and run by ad man George Edward Creel, for the sole purpose of convincing the general 
public (which wanted to remain neutral) that American involvement in the war was a 
positive act. Since Americans generally wanted to stay out of the fight, some attempt to 
convince them otherwise was deemed important in order to avoid political repercussions 
and to elicit cooperation. Another example of intentional manipulation was the Persian 
Gulf War, when it was acknowledged after the war that press releases by the government 
of Iraqi troops committing atrocities in Kuwait were either made up or exaggerated to 
generate strong public reaction against Saddam Hussein in order to gain public approval 
to send troops to the area. In other words, support was once again needed for a war effort 
when the public did not generally want to fight. 
Zaller additionally cites V.O. Key, Jr., from page 2 of The Respomible Electorate, 
"The voice of the people is but an echo. The output of an echo chamber bears an 
inevitable and invariable relation to the input. As candidates and parties clamor for 
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attention and vie for popular support, the people's verdict can be no more than a selective 
reflection from the alternatives and outlooks presented to them. (Zaller, Opinions, 1992, 
310) In this section of his book, Zaller cites several studies from the 1980s and 1991 
supporting the influence of an elite over media content, thus public opinion. (p. 311) 
Many people today (perhaps over a certain age) are familiar with the claim, 
attributed to Hitler, that if he could have a child until the age of seven, he could control 
that child for life. The rationale for such a claim, of course, is the exercised control over 
the ideology during formative years, when thought structures are being formed. A Zaller 
elitist modeler carries this farther by asking if a small group ( small in the sense of 
percentage to the whole) could exercise a similar sufficient control over intellectual 
resources to influence individuals to accept ( or reject), or lobby for ( or against), certain 
policy decisions, how would it be attempted? What would it look like? Is there a way to 
trace influence back to such a group? 
The Dye elitist model 
We already acknowledge that politics involves image and "spin doctoring" in the 
media and other public forums in order to either appeal to some individuals or cause 
rejection. Therefore, we know there are attempts to manipulate public opinion at times. 
Apparently because some degree of this is considered acceptable, it is not generally 
referred to as conspiracy theory. The Thomas R. Dye elitist model takes this acceptance a 
step farther. It asks: If sufficient influence over ideology is possible, coupled with 
controlled information through the media and public forums ( that is already 
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acknowledged to occur) and perceived incentives or disincentives ( of the Gaventa type), 
could more control over outcomes be accomplished by those controlling at least fifty 
percent of the resources in viable sectors? To return to our puzzle metaphor, could the 
puzzle pieces be manipulated in order to change the picture that would otherwise 
emerge? If this is possible, how could it be done? Who would be in a position to do it? 
Dye assumes that those who control more than fifty percent of the resources in necessary 
sectors are in a position to cany out such a possible manipulation. On the assumption that 
such influence exists, Dye modelers look for it in order to supply quantification to the 
Zaller and Gaventa models - at least every four years - and expand them. Pluralist 
modelers do not look for this influence beyond the elective level because they assume 
policy is made at that level, where it is enacted. This difference reflects how the 
difference in underlying assumptions can influence the puzzle pieces being used and, 
possibly, conclusions as to why something happened. 
It has already been acknowledged that influence on public opinion can be 
exercised through the control of media content and other information accessible by 
individuals (who probably do not have security clearance or the means to access all 
information that exists on any given topic). Control of information, whether it is 
intentional to influence outcome or simply through the decision-making process of 
deciding what will be presented within the time or space constraints ( and how it will be 
presented), serves as a limit to information access for individuals to use in the process of 
forming opinions. Neither pluralist, nor elitist, modelers deny that the ideologies of 
individuals serve to prioritize values, goals, and relationships, influencing reactions to the 
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available information that is received. Pluralist modelers consider it a problem to prove 
quantitatively (referring to the brain as a "black box" whose inner workings are 
unknown), while Zaller, Dye, and Gaventa elitist modelers like to explore the issue. It is 
only by exploring the issue that possible break-through results could happen. When 
pluralists avoid looking at this type of study, they delay work that could add more depth 
to their analyses. 
Thomas R. Dye even identifies times when a faction of his identified group of 
elites has worked against their own perceived maximized interests, thus belying the 
assumption by pluralist modelers that individuals act in their own self interests. More 
work needs to be done in this area by both broad groups of modelers. Dye also examines 
an identified ideological split within his identified groups of elites that he believes 
accounts for the changing underlying assumptions for policy. More about this will be 
found in the section on ideology. 
Pluralists agree that it can be shown an individual has influence in one area, but 
they argue that it cannot be shown that that same individual has influence in sufficient 
multiple areas necessary to steer the outcome of an issue, or policy. This is a legitimate 
criticism of some elitist models, including Zaller' s. Dye elitist modelers respond that if it 
can be shown that the same members of a group consistently occupy board memberships 
in key areas, consistently contribute funds for certain activities, and tend to agree on 
outcomes, then the members of this group are collectively exerting influence through 
resource control to move in a certain direction - just as pluralists say lobbying groups do 
at the congressional level. It is the collective actions of such a group of elites that are 
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monitored by Dye elitist modelers for influence over policy decisions. I make the 
assumption that it can be assumed that to belong to such a group and have influence, it is 
necessary to think and act in an approved way by at least one of the factions represented 
within the group. Pluralist modelers apply this same thinking to their models of 
congressional policymaking, but they do not go beyond this to other levels in an attempt 
to establish influence through the control of resources. 
Elected officials have additional influences 
The above examples are some of the major influences over all individuals that 
work to form opinions on issues, but elected officials have additional influences that may 
determine their policy positions beyond their own preferences. The additional influence 
over elected officials can be exercised through such things as control of the purse strings 
to finance election campaigns ( which equates spending to constituent voting by being 
able to air positions and issues). Dye's work on quantification shows the potential for 
influence over both the choice of issues as well as the position taken on each- in a 
manner not unlike the political correctness of classroom curriculum. Influence can also 
be shown by what is reported in the media, as well as the manner in which it is reported, 
as supported by McClosky, Zaller, and Key in their research and modeling. 
Various pluralist models do look at access to elected officials and draw 
conclusions from this access to resulting policy positions by these officials. Pluralist 
results show that campaign contributions may "buy" access for potential influence, but 
voting outcomes do not always appear to correspond to this, leading pluralists to look for 
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additional explanations. This is a good start, but then they limit their search to those 
groups that are actually lobbying, because that can be seen and quantified. According to 
their insistence on quantification, the group controlling the resources is small in number, 
compared to the other lobbyists, therefore the conclusion is that money may buy access 
but not necessarily results. This leads them to say that issues may vary in importance to 
various groups and individuals. They do not attempt to explain the possible reason for 
the importance or seeming unimportance, or possible lack of activity by some. 
An elitist modeler using Zaller and Dye might look at the funds being contributed 
to the election campaigns to see who the largest contributors are and what these 
contributors received for their contributions. They would also look to see if there is a 
"John Gaventa" power hierarchy that might influence officials by the perceived threat of 
the cutoff of campaign funds or media content. In addition, such elitist modelers would 
look to see what else these contributors were involved in and to what extent their 
involvement was a controlling position by working in tandem with others who shared 
their outcomes. Such involvements could include board seats on corporations, 
foundations, universities, or some combination of these that work to influence public 
opinion and research. These are the type of quantifications Dye supplies for the Zaller 
elitist modeler. 
The elitist modeler using Zaller and Dye starts with the assumptions of ideology, 
life experiences, and other influences and looks to see if it is possible to exert control 
over such things as the school curriculum, media content, and Gaventa 
incentives/disincentives in order to make it appear that the public lobbying of elected 
12 
officials is pluralist in nature. What would be under control in such an elitist model are 
the controlled options being offered to the public from which to select and the manner in 
which information is processed Such an elitist modeler would then look to see if there is 
a control over resources influencing these options that can be traced ultimately back to a 
group of individuals - thus the term "elitist model." It would work something like the 
following demonstration. How do you get a "wild" animal ( such as a bear) to "act" in a 
movie? The answer is that a situation is created - knowing the general behavior patterns 
of the animal - in which it could be expected to react in a certain manner. As long as the 
animal is not aware of the contrivance of the situatio~ it will probably react as expected. 
Animal handlers explain this process in exactly this manner. 
Dye assumes that ideas tend to come from think tanks ( financed through 
contributions) which then disseminate through the colleges and universities, the media, 
and elected officials for their use. It is anticipated by Zaller, Key, and Dye elitist 
modelers that these ideas will work their way to increasing numbers of people over time, 
who should respond in generally predictable manners (as long as they remain unaware of 
the contrivance taking place). For this reaso~ some of the questions asked by Dye elitist 
modelers are: Who is funding the think tanks that are disseminating ideas? Is there a 
correlation in funding and board membership between the think tanks and the foundations 
that award grants for work on certain projects and not on others? Is there a correlation 
between these and the ownership of the media that presents the information to the public? 
Is there a correlation between these activities and large campaign contributions? Zaller' s 
work corresponds to Dye's in the sense of identifying a group of elites who exert 
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influence on public opinion ( and who sometimes appear divided). Both Zaller and Dye 
include elected officials in the lower echelon of opinion influencers. For this reason, 
McClosky and Zaller consider the pluralist models of opinion inverted as to the actual 
flow of influence. (McClosky and Zaller, The American Ethos, 1984, 234) 
Polls are one way of tracking public acceptance of, or rejection of, ideas. Zaller' s 
elitist model says that some individuals will accept these ideas, some will reject them; the 
outcome will depend on their individual predispositions for the idea. It is possible that 
some of the underlying assumptions of an issue or idea will go against those of the 
ideology adopted by the individual, causing rejection. Zaller also says that the manner in 
which the information is presented can influence acceptance or rejection. This idea puts 
the burden back on the media and classroom content. 
According to Dye' s elitist model, only by examining what is going on prior to 
news stories or changes in curriculum content (in other words, more pieces to the puzzle), 
is it possible to show that policy decisions can be made prior to the public knowing about 
them, thus being unable to apply any public pluralist pressure on elected officials until 
later. Pluralists argue that just because something occurred prior to an event, it does not 
mean there is a relationship between the two. This is true. Just because it rains in 
Turkey, for example, does not mean the rain is responsible for com growing ( or not 
growing) in Iowa. One possible rebuttal to this pluralist argument could be that it does 
not mean such occurrences should be ignored every time either. Sometimes connections 
do not exist, but sometimes they are not readily apparent for a variety of reasons. They 
could work something like zooming a lens in or out to get either a close-up or a broader 
14 
picture of a subject for better context. Closing your mind to potentialities of relationship 
can possibly retard research. We have already seen throughout history that positions on 
issues can change over time. Just because something is not politically correct at one time · 
does not mean it will always remain politically incorrect. All disciplines are rife with 
such examples. There are weaknesses to all models. This does not mean the models 
should be rejected out of hand; more research could help strengthen them. 
Dye has noted what appears to be a divergence of opinion within his group of 
identified elites. While this group seems to agree on the goals for the group as a whole, 
they appear to disagree on the means to achieve those goals because of an ideological 
cleavage. While McClosky and Zaller identify the cleavage as liberal versus 
conservative, their description also corresponds to the description of debate between 
individualism versus community that has been documented historically. One of these 
identified factions believes in the individual pursuit of self-interests and laissez-faire 
(similar to the ideology that allowed for the rise of Rockefeller, Carnegie, and the other 
industrialists that were called robber barons by the Populists during their time), while the 
other faction believes in a societal responsibility to ameliorate the consequences of these 
individualist actions in order to better distribute resources in order to avoid societal 
instability and unrest. 
Can these actions be shown to have happened at any point in time? Elitist 
modelers say that it can be so explained by historical events. It can generally be broken 
down into the nouveau riche who gained their wealth quickly during the industrialization 
and expansion of the United States during the latter 1800s, and the old wealth of what is 
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called the "Eastern Establishment.,, As the numbers within these two identified factions 
change, Dye sees changing influences to the rest of society. Bear in mind that pluralists 
would only acknowledge that the changes in dominant thinking have taken place. An 
application of this theory to such a change in both the late 1800s and the 1930s would 
conclude that the stability of the country ( and, thus, the power of the group of elites as a 
whole) was sufficiently at stake that the political power of the Populist Movement had to 
be co-opted, and, in the 1930s, the permanent farm legislation (based on Populist ideas) 
was enacted in 1938 to ameliorate the massive instability and citizen unrest. By the time 
World War TI ended, the situation had stabilized. 
Ideologies 
Ideologies come from religious beliefs ( or some substitute dogma) and other 
aspects of the social and cultural background of all individuals. A broad example of 
these differences, that can be documented as an ongoing debate, would be an emphasis on 
putting the good of the community first, with individuals within the community 
benefiting as a result, versus an emphasis on allowing individuals freedom to pursue and 
maximize their own ends, with the expectation that this increased individual freedom will 
result in benefits for the community. These arguments continue in the form of political, 
economic, and social theories. Some examples would include socialism (to redistribute 
the wealth that "clumps" under individualist capitalism), communism (to rebut the 
assumptions of capitalism), and Catholicism (to rebut the Protestant and secular 
influences on the form of capitalism that focuses on individual pursuit of self-interest). 
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While socialism and communism may be included in the public school system, 
Catholicism most certainly is not, leading to misunderstandings of motives behind the 
actions of some groups and individuals. Historically, the rise and fall of each ideology -
as they have moved in and out of what is considered politically correct at any point in 
time - can be shown to have influence on different eras. 
Each of these broad ideologies has a different goal with different values that will 
influence individuals to respond differently to issues and to information about those 
issues. Pluralist modelers tend to ignore these because they assume individuals act in 
their own interests, thus possibly tainting the interpretation of the quantified data by this 
assumption because the three ideologies cited above operate on a different set of 
assumptions. Zaller and Dye elitist modelers try to explore this area. 
Also influencing the thought process is the type of education received. A broad 
debate today identifies three broad divisions in educational situations: church, public, and 
home-schooling. Differing ideological philosophies drive each of these broad 
categories. McClosky and Zaller look at education in their book, The American Ethos, 
and Dye also examines it in his books. Since these works talk about the influence of 
educators over public opinion, the content of curriculum is important. History shows 
changes in not only curriculum subject matter, but changes in position on subjects. One 
example of this is Charles Darwin's theory of evolution, published as Origins of the 
Species in 1859. While there might have been an eventual acceptance, by some, to 
adding the topic of animals evolving over time to the curriculum, the minute the theory 
was applied to people ( or applied to economic theory to become social Darwinism), those 
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whose ideologies rejected this application reacted negatively to it. They did not want 
these ideas being taught in schools to children ( forming their thought strucutres ), and 
fought those who wanted it in the curricuh.1m~ because it violated the underlying 
assumptions of their ideologies. There is still a controversy today with some religious 
sects because this is now a part of most public school curriculums. Even the Catholi, for 
example, Church is still struggling with this controversy. 
Another example influencing curriculum content is the emphasis on community 
welfare versus individualism. The sense of community was needed for survival during 
times such as the Great Depression, and historians have acknowledged an increase in this 
response at such times. War efforts continued this response from the 1930s into the 
1940s. Curriculums of the 1950s and into the 1960s still contained teachings on 
community welfare as unions expanded their power and the economy expanded. Citizens 
were told to "buy American" because it supported the American way of life. Policy was 
based on this. It demonstrated a sense of community. In the late 1960s and into the 1970s 
there were public signs that this was changing, as the emphasis switched to maximizing 
profit and income, and individuals pursued their own self-interests. One example of a 
change that occurred was the reduction of funding to NASA after 1969, whose science to 
push the U.S. into a leadership position in regard to space, translated to new products that 
benefited society and added more jobs. Some of the scientists who were laid off by the 
space agency went to work for Wall Street brokerages to design investment instruments 
that could "whi~saw" within the markets and allow for the potential capturing of greater 
yields by investors who used them. This is an example of thinking moving from the 
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accomplishments of a space program for the perceived benefit of community to 
maximizing individual investment portfolios through greater return on resources. We see 
this reflected today with the admonition to maximize investment returns and to look for 
the lowest cost deal. Anyone reading NAFT A and GA TI would see by the preambles 
alone that the focus is on being able to move capital unimpeded in order to maximize 
profits to investors. "Buying American" is definitely out of style as a community support 
effort- a political incorrectness today that was supported in prior years. 
The idea of what is acceptable and what is unacceptable at any given time extends 
to teachers and professors as they wish to be employed and have their research funde~ 
accepted and published. (As most professors and writers can tell you, there is a political 
correctness they must adhere to if they want to be employed or published - which can 
also be conditions of employment.) These serve as incentives, or disincentives, to either 
think in a certain acceptable manner ( either espousing or assuming certain values), or at 
least pretend to. The end result can be a degree of control over the curriculum content 
(by who gets hired and what is taught) and the research (what gets funded and published), 
or at least the manner in which some topics are presented (just as with the media). This 
gets passed along to the students as they are graded partially on how well they learn what 
is considered to be an acceptable curriculum - which history shows to change over time. 
It is also shown by who gets hired and fired. 
Dye, an elitist modeler, includes a list of his twenty-five most heavily endowed 
private universities in his Who's Running America: The Clinton Years. (p. 137) Also 
included in that same publication are the percentages of various factions of his identified 
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elites who were educated at one or another of these most prestigious institutions. (p. 177) 
Updates of the most heavily endowed universities are provided each year in the 
Chronicle of Higher Education. Dye's conclusion is that about fifty percent of top 
leaders overall attended one or another of just twelve universities. Other institutions, 
whose assumed goal is to produce graduates who are employable, in theory adjust their 
curriculums to mirror what they see as desirable from the leadership. These actions 
generate a culture of political correctness that Dye traces back to the most heavily 
endowed education institutions leading the way. Because Dye always looks to see who is 
controlling at least fifty percent of each sector under examinatio°' the numbers become 
significant when intersections of these various sector groups occur. 
In both my experience as a political activist (both with Catholic groups and 
without) and as a researcher, I have found that people do tend to fall into one of two 
general, very broad, categories of ideologies: They are either individual-oriented 
(meaning they will adopt various ideas based on some form of putting individual interests 
and laissez-faire first), or they are community-oriented (meaning they will adopt various 
ideas that put community interests first and government intervention as necessary to 
ameliorate the situation). The observation has been around for a very long time and is 
supported by research going back to antiquity. Plato cited it in his Republic dialogues. 
Researchers tracking the ideological split of the Protestant Reformation from Catholicism 
and the rise of secularism talk about this specific difference and the influence each had on 
political, social, and economic policies. European historiography also documents this in 
the assumptions of historians as they attempt to interpret their historical research. 
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Enlightenment writings are full of it, particularly if the Catholic Counter Reformation 
writings ( which are community-based) are studied, but they are not included in American 
public school curriculum. 
While there are those individuals who might appear to go back and forth between 
these two broad categories, closer inspection should show that they really belong in the 
first group of individualists. The reason for this is because they are likely making the 
switch based on individual interests, depending on which policy they believe will be of 
benefit to them personally. Notice that this fits the assumption of pluralist modelers that 
individuals act in their own self-interests. Zaller and Dye elitist modelers believe that 
because they at least acknowledge the existence of ideologies, and that these influence 
people to accept or reject ideas, they are in a better position to interpret situations than 
pluralist modelers, even if they sometimes struggle to identify the ideologies and maybe 
do not always get them right. This is an argument pluralists need to respond to. 
The optical illusion (Figure 1) on the next page serves to illustrate the difference 
between how elitist modelers and pluralist modelers picture situations. The pluralist 
modelers, with their narrow quantifiable data and assumption that individuals act in their 
own self interests, are in a position to see only one of the pictures represented - usually 
the old woman because it is more easily recognizable with fewer "pieces of the puzzle". 
The elitist modelers, with their acknowledgement of ideologies and the significance of 
the differences between them, are in the position to see both the young, beautiful, Gay 
Nineties woman as well as the old woman. While there will be some individuals who see 
both pictures but will not acknowledge it because they see more opportunities for 
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themselves by only admitting to being able to see one of them (political correctness in 
action), others will see both and will openly acknowledge it. Modelers and pollsters need 
to be aware of these traits as they apply to responses on issues. What this means is that 
when someone says they are not persuaded by the argument ( if the argument is based on 
a different ideology and set of assumptions), then the very weakness someone can point 
out (based on a particular ideological bent) often seems inconsequential to the person 
holding a different ideology and set of assumptions. 
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Figure 1. Optical Illusion 
Source: Created by cartoonist W.E. Hill, originally published in Puck in 1915 
as "My wife and My Mother-in-law." 
When it comes to congressional policy ... 
The pluralists account for the change in congressional policy as a change in the 
influences over Congress through lobbying constituencies. Robert A Dahl, considered a 
leading spokesman for pluralists, begins with the assumption that the focus is on political 
roles because the assumption of pluralists is that this is where policy is actually enacted. 
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He says that an imperical problem arises when there is an attempt to account for and 
explain influence. He does not see a satisfactory objective method for weighing the 
scope of influence because he does not believe it can be quantified The examples he 
cites to argue his point consist of attempts at quantificatio°' carefully choosing subjects in 
order to make such attempts appear absurd. (Robert A. Dahl, Modern Political Analysis, 
1984, 29) What he does is assume that because an actor can be shown to have influence 
in one area - which he does not deny - that it can be shown that same actor does not exert 
influence in all of the areas in a complex situation to explain the outcome. 
Dye elitist modelers would not argue with that conclusion; they would argue that 
Dahl, and other pluralists, overlook the combined effect of a sufficient number of such 
resource-controllers - working as a group just as lobbyists do -- taking the same position 
and applying their combined influence through their control of resources in all of the 
sectors of the complex situation in which they do collectively exert sufficient control 
necessary to influence policy. This description of "morphingn of influence over sectors 
in order to exert sufficient influence is the model used by pluralists at the congressional 
level, but it is the Zaller and Dye elitist modelers who show this process at work in areas 
of influence. This is an inconsistency on the part of pluralists that is a weakness in their 
modeling. They seriously need to take a better look at this in their work, rather than 
brushing it aside as being unimportant, not quantifiable, and conspiracy theory. 
Zaller, s elitist model accounts for the apparent see-sawing of congressional policy 
by an ideological split within the elites, thus leading to divergent influences. (Zaller, The 
Nature and Origins of Mass Opinion, 1992) His 1992 book shows how variations in the 
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discourse of elites affect both the direction and organiz.ation of public opinion. (Zaller, 
1992, 14) He acknowledges that the conception of elite discourse is more elaborate than 
pluralists would like for a satisfying measurement and testing. According to Zaller, what 
is termed "the mainstream media" is one of the elements of the control structure. Only 
some things are reported for mass consumption. Only certain options are put out from 
which the masses select. Applying his theory to the media, other opinions that are put 
forth for consideration in other non-mainstream publications are labeled in such ways as 
to attempt to discourage acceptance. "Radical" would be one term. "Uninformed" would 
be another term. "Outdated thinking" has been used. The labeling strategy works to 
exert subtle pressure in the form of what we call today "political correctness." Applied 
elitist theory would say that the result is only certain ideas being taught in the school 
curriculums as "correct" ways of thinking that influence the processing of information; 
only acceptable ideas appear in the mainstream media. Dye assumes such decisions come 
from a group of elites and attempts to identify them. Pluralists say the decisions come 
from the morphing of other, broader, interest groups within the community without 
attempting to explain how this comes about. 
In his book, Zaller also describes the ways a group of elites could influence 
opinion, even allowing for differing ideologies. Zaller cites examples of what happens to 
public opinion when there is a differing opinion within the elites themselves. He goes on 
to cite such a split in the elites as explaining political support for opposing candidates 
while using the opportunity to get out more information for each side of an issue in order 
to "test the waters" and see if more work is needed to influence opinion. According to 
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him, public opinion polls keep track of what public opinion is doing in regard to specific 
issues. Dye carries this a step further by noting that adjustments to media content and 
curriculum content can be made from poll results, taking underlying ideologies into 
account. This is the thinking that goes into a Zaller and Dye, combined, elitist model. 
Pluralists would look at the opinion polls and draw conclusions that the numbers were 
changing. Personal experiences and/or apathy might be cited to explain the numbers. 
Some pluralist congressi,onal models 
When modeling is done to determine why members of Congress support and vote 
for specific legislation, it is necessary to include their thought structure on policy issues, 
how they inform themselves on policy issues, and how they see the structure of power. 
In addition to this, the questions being asked are significant. If the researcher is only 
interpreting information based on his own mind set, this influences both the questions 
asked as well as the interpretation of the results. (It has already been pointed out that 
pluralist modelers assume individuals act in their own self-interests, indicating that 
modelers themselves think this way.) If you want to be published, being politically 
correct helps, just as wanting to be elected can influence the decisions of elected officials 
as acknowledged by both pluralist and elitist modelers. The reader of these studies must 
keep this in mind when assessing them. Zaller does a good job of pointing out that 
opinions can appear to change within a range of possibilities depending on what options 
( if any) are being offered by the group he cites as elites, whether or not the context is 
clear in the media coverage, and to what extent the individuals can fit the information 
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into their predispositions. His elitist model actually works to blend many of the 
prevailing pluralist models in an effort to show that they are not necessarily wrong, they 
are just looking at varying, narrow, domains of information that really exist within a 
broader context. 
R. Douglas Arnold, in his book, The Logic of Congressional Action, asks the 
questions: Why does Congress enact the policies that it does? Why does Congress 
frequently approve proposals that serve organized interests or that deliver narrowly 
targeted geographic benefits? Why does Congress sometimes break free of parochial 
concerns and enact bills that serve more diffuse, general, or unorganized interests? 
Arnold maintains that legislators know that those constituents who are more 
affected by legislation are more attentive to what Congress is doing and are also more 
likely to show their approval or disapproval at the polls than those who have less at stake 
and pay less attention. This is a common pluralist model assumption, that people monitor 
Congress and are aware of pending legislation that will affect them. This assumption 
tends to ignore those people who are poor or not as well educated and do not have much 
political power unless they are specifically organized for that purpose, such as the Civil 
Rights Movement (a time of great unrest). They may be personally affected by 
legislation but not consider themselves in a position to do anything about it (possibly a 
Gaventa argument). Welfare reform would serve as a recent example. Given the 
numbers of people receiving some form of assistance, the talk of reform should have 
resulted in large numbers of people responding negatively to the legislation. The 
discussion, however, took place between other societal factions. According to Gaventa, 
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pluralist models are one-dimensional, ignoring the sometimes-subtle exercise of power 
against certain would-be participants in order to exclude them, as well as the various 
means used to accomplish this. This would be in addition to ignoring the influences over 
information and thought structure for processing it. Pluralist modelers could avoid this 
argument against them if they would look for potential power hierarchies that could, 
possibly, exert influence. 
Arnold's theory makes the assumption that members of Congress care intensely 
about getting reelected. His argument, therefore, is that this electoral quest spurs 
legislators to support policies that serve either particular or general interests. However, 
both attentive and inattentive citizens ( a method pluralists use to explain why some 
citizens do not respond in their own interests) can set limits on congressional actions if 
issues are framed in a way that allows citizens to reward and punish their representatives 
for specific deeds. He goes on to explain that if legislators can hide their actions by 
delegating authority to the executive, by combining all actions into a single omnibus bill 
(that is difficult to wade through), by meeting behind closed doors, or by acting without a 
recorded vote ( such as a voice vote), then constituents cannot reward or punish them. If 
legislators are forced to take public positions on specific programs, they can be held 
accountable. 
According to Arnold, congressional decisions depend on four factors: what 
proposals coalition leaders introduce, what strategies proponents and opponents employ, 
what actions attentive and inattentive citizens will allow, and what policies legislators 
prefer themselves. (Arnold, The Logic of Congressional Action, 121-2) Elitist modelers 
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would respond to these conclusions in the following manner. If elected officials are only 
interested in getting re-elected, as Arnold assumes for his pluralist model, why would 
these elected officials support legislation that their constituencies would not like and that 
would be held against them in the next election if constituencies knew about it? Why 
would they need a strategy to deal with this situation? Other than their own interests of 
getting re-elected, whose interests are they really working for? To what extent are these 
elected officials able to manipulate information- or have it manipulated for them? 
Arnold needs to expand his explanations to account for these questions. 
In his only example for agriculture, Arnold focuses on sugar subsidies in an 
attempt to show that it was pressure from lobbyists that accounts for the loss of the 
subsidies and the regaining of them later. He accepts at face value that there was a 
worldwide shortage of sugar, merely because the price tripled in 1974, and the news 
media said the reason was a shortage. A check of USDA and U.N. Food and Agriculture 
Organization (F AO) reports for the 1970s ( and now) show no such shortage of sugar 
either world wide or in America, although they do show the tripling of consumer price. 
Why was the news media - and the classroom curriculums - talking about a shortage of 
sugar when the actual reports of the time show no such shortage? Rebuttal explanations 
that the reports were wrong do not hold water because the reports for the time period in 
which the news media was reporting shortages show there was no shortage. These 
USDA reports occasionally do contain errors, but usually the errors are caught at a later 
time and corrected That is not the case with the supply of sugar. The reports of today 
have not been altered to show an adjustment for the supply of sugar at the time supplies 
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were reported by the media to be short. This is a weakness on the part of Arnold's work 
that he needs to address. Zaller and Dye elitist modelers would point out that he misses 
the whole context of the timing of this action on sugar subsidies - the desire to 
intentionally restructure agriculture - that had been under discussion by those in a group 
of elitist-modeler-identified elites since 1944. These same elitist modelers would say that 
the media publication of sugar shortages, combined with placing the blame for the 
supposed shortages on subsidies, worked to call public attention to agricultural subsidies 
in a way that made them appear to work against the best interests of consumers ( as they 
looked for the lowest-cost buying opportunity). 
In their narrow scope of vision, pluralist modelers do not take into account the 
power of multinational food companies (and the individuals who run them), whose share 
of the consumer dollar has doubled since 1949 ( according to the USDA Statistical 
Yearbooks) at the expense of the commodity producers. The individuals behind these 
multinational food companies have the money to pay for foundations to finance 
university research into specific areas. The individuals behind these multinational 
corporations have the resources to have certain curriculums taught (based on that paid-for 
research). The individuals behind these multinational food companies can pay for 
advertising to promote certain ideas to consumers. The individuals behind these 
multinational food companies can pay for congressional campaigns. Even some 
professors at Iowa State University (a land grant institution) held a closed meeting to 
object to the influence of businesses over research and curriculum. ( Only the action of 
the committee was published, not the names. It would be interesting to know if these 
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professors are still employed at the university.) This is an ongoing debate that at times 
reaches the levels as in the time of the Populists, and then subsides. 
Most consumers do not read the sources that would tell them anything not already 
paid to be put in front of them, and most schools and news media do not cite those other 
sources because they are not politically correct. Multinational companies long ago 
became part of the structure of the USDA, land grant colleges, Experiment Stations, 
Extension Services, and American Farm Bureau in supporting the industrialization and 
commercialization of agriculture because they saw it as being in their best interests to 
contribute to these activities - just as the Populists pointed out. In terms of control, the 
multinational companies of today are every bit as powerful as the monopolies and trusts 
the Populist Movement fought against one hundred years ago. Remember that today's 
agriculture structure was implemented in 1862 and continued to be put into place during 
the late 1800s, when the industrialization and commercialization of America was 
progressing at a fever pitch. Those researchers applying a Zaller, Dye, and Gaventa 
combined elitist model would look at these structures of control as influential to policy. 
Pluralists would not, even though they might mention their existence. 
Such control was part of what the Populists were fighting against. Historian 
Norman Pollack writes that the Populists were against the impact of the excesses of the 
new science and technologies that went unchecked. When these new ideas were used to 
the advantage of some and to the disadvantage of others, and when industrialists ( the 
Populist-named "robber barons") benefited while the masses suffered, Populists 
considered this wrong. Applying the Zaller, Dye, and Gaventa elitist model to the 
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structure discussed above, the conclusion would be that it is the task of the above-cited 
system to convince the public this industrialization and commercialization was a good 
thing (because it was seen as efficient and as increasing profits - a different set of 
assumptions), so legislators who vote for legislation supporting this policy will be 
rewarded with reelection. Pluralists would look to see what groups were forming for 
congressional lobbying purposes. 
John Mark Hansen, in his book Gaining Access: Congress and the Farm Lobby, 
1919-1981, looks at what he calls the evolution of interest group access to Congress. He 
asks the questions: Why did various interest group coalitions develop when they did and 
as they did? Why did they subsequently change? Summarizing his study, Hansen says it 
roots the evolution of interest group access in the decisions of local elites, with explicit 
attention to the goals of elites and their political environment, and their options. While he 
uses the term "elites," it becomes apparent that his definition of elites is no higher than 
the legislators themselves, not anyone who might have greater power through resources 
to influence the legislators, as elitist modelers would look for. Hansen's definition is the 
same definition Dahl uses. 
Like Arnold, Hansen believes that the primary focus of legislators is reelection. 
Interest groups have access to Congress if they work for coalitions and supply 
information that results in legislators taking the "right" stand on issues that are desired by 
their constituents - those who will vote. These issues also must be seen by the legislators 
as things that will recur, thus worth the time, the effort, and the expense. Hansen 
maintains that as long as these individuals and resulting coalitions supply the right 
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information about the wants of constituents, they have access to legislators. When the 
information fails the legislators who rely on it, access is reduced or eliminated. 
Using this theory, Hansen interprets the resulting access to members of Congress 
as indicators of the resulting farm policy legislation. Congressional hearings are used as 
part of his database, making the assumption that congressional decisions are made on the 
basis of who testifies at hearings and who does not. He never acknowledges the 
formation and structure of the land grant college system, Experiment Stations, Extension 
Service, and the American Farm Bureau, nor its connection to the USDA Neither does 
he cite these as experts (politically correct or not) who would be expected to testify at the 
hearings he examined. Like Arnold, he similarly does not take into account the manner 
in which the public informs itself off ood policy issues in order to care what their elected 
representatives are doing in this regard. He does not examine the funding of the coalition 
groups that lobby, and the interests they serve. Elitist modelers would say that he begins 
his study at a point where the policy decision has already been made, by those that are 
generally unseen, and then looks at how legislation is either enacted or killed, based on 
who testifies at the congressional hearings. Elitist modelers would say congressional 
hearings are "dog and pony shows." 
William P. Browne, in his book Cultivating Congress: Constituents, Issues, and 
Interests in Agricultural Policymaking, attempts to show how legislators use information 
and sources of information to carry out their tasks of representing their constituents. He 
assumes that legislators are organized and bounded by public opinion. Elitist modelers 
would say he fails to examine how that public opinion is being informed for position on 
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issues. Browne asks the question of how members of Congress have changed their policy 
responsiveness due to increased individualism and a more opportunity-laden policy 
environment? He uses his theory to manipulate his database to emphasize how members 
of Congress use their limited policy discretion to represent those with whom they are 
most familiar and dependent. While he acknowledges the relationship structure of the 
USD~ land grant college syste~ et.al., he does not see this as having any undue 
influence over Congressional policy decisions, nor on public opinion, contrary to the 
position of Zaller and Dye elitist modelers. Zaller and Dye elitist modelers would say it 
appears he does not believe that experts and curriculum have a part in influencing public 
opm1on. A weakness of his model is that he fails to look at how public opinions are 
formed. 
The focus of this paper 
While pluralist modelers have contented themselves to look at Congress and what 
is going on there, Zaller, Dye, and Gaventa elitist modelers would assert that the change 
in agricultural policy really began in 1942, when a group of 200 individuals representing 
various business interests was organized for the purpose of planning the war economy as 
well as the economic rebuilding to follow the end of World War II. The name of this 
group was the Committee for Economic Development (C.E.D.). It is still in existence 
today issuing policy position papers on various topics, although it is now composed of 
lower-level executives rather than the leaders of businesses and colleges as it was for the 
first few decades of its existence. 
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According to Dye, the C.E.D. was a central organization for developing elite 
consensus, researching national problems, and directing national policy. (Dye, 1976, 
112) The founder of the C.E.D. was Paul Hoffman (former chairman of the board of 
Studebaker-Packard Corporation; a U.S. delegate to the United Nations; a trustee of the 
Ford Foundation, the University of Chicago, and Kenyon College; a director of New 
York Life Insurance Co., Time, Inc., Encyclopedia Britannica, the Automotive Safety 
Foundation; and chairman of the fund for the Republic). Another key person on this 
committee was William Benton (a trustee of the University of Chicago, University of 
Bridgeport, Brandeis University, Kennedy Library, and the American Assembly; and a 
member of the Council on foreign Relations). 
The early members were drawn chiefly from the Business Advisory Council of 
the Department of Commerce, established by Roosevelt during the Depression to bring 
businessmen into the Administration. The stature of the C.E.D. increased when President 
Truman appointed one of its original trustees, Thomas B. McCabe ( chairman of the board 
of Scott Paper Company) to the chairmanship of the board of the Federal Reserve 
System. McCabe served in this position from 1948 to 1951. The membership of the 
C.E.D. in 1970 included representatives from major food companies: Robert C. 
Cosgrove, president of Jolly Green Giant Co.; John M. Fox, president of United Fruit Co, 
former president ofMinute Maid Corp., Director of the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston; 
H.J. Heinz II, chairman of the board ofH. J. Heinz Co., director of Mellon National 
Bank & Trust, a trustee of Carnegie Institute of Technology; Robert J. Kleberg, Jr., 
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president of King Ranch, Inc. (Dye, 1976) The membership in 1970 is important 
because of the focus of this paper on the USDA Young Executive Committee of 1971. 
The idea that businessmen would attempt to influence thinking and policy in 
society is not a new idea. Cultural historians show that the industrialization of society in 
the late 1800s and early 1900s led to a push by industrialists for changes in society. 
Cultural studies show a blending of social Darwinism, the Protestant work ethic, and 
natural selection with classical economics in ideas that were promoted with the goal of 
making America into the image of a modern industrial country. One of the terms used 
for this image was the "Crown of Civilization." (Teddy Roosevelt, The Winning of the 
West, 1889-1896, four volumes) The Country Life Movement, formed by Pres. Theodore 
Roosevelt, looked at rural schools and tried to implement changes to make the education 
offered conform with the group's vision of what should be taught in order to better 
conform with what they saw as necessary to industrial business and society. In a similar 
manner, the business sector today pushes for schools to include such things as knowledge 
of computers in the curriculum because workers need to know this to be considered 
employable and good employees. There is a history of presidential commissions being 
formed to examine issues and make recommendations. These committees are usually 
composed of various levels of those Zaller and Dye elitist modelers consider elites within 
society. Because pluralist modelers do not look at these possible influences, it could be 
concluded that they consider them unimportant to policy formation. 
In view of historical precedent, the formation of the C.E.D. was not out of the 
ordinary. The C.E.D. published policy position papers on agricultural policy in 1944, 
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again in 1956, 1957, and 1962. While the description of the current situation of 
agriculture differed in each of these position papers, the recommended policy change 
remained the same, because it indicated the goal of this group, identified by the elitist 
modelers as elites: 
1) A three-part program to bring agricultural production and supply into 
balance with demand by 
a) Gradual removal, within definite limits, of farm price and 
income supports except for temporary emergency situations 
and 
b) A Land Retirement Program dedicated - unlike the present Soil 
Bank - specifically and singly to reducing the resources 
devoted to agriculture, including both people and land, so that 
farmers may share equitably in the national prosperity and 
economic growth, at free market prices, together with 
c) Disposal of surpluses now held by the government. 
2) Removal, at the end of a limited transition period, of acreage allotments 
and marketing controls, and restoration of the farmer's freedom to manage 
his own enterprise. 
3) Retention of stand-by authority for the temporary use of price support 
loans based - to guard against accumulation of surpluses - on expected, 
normal market prices, so as to shield the farmer from severe and sudden 
depletion of his income by forces, such as unexpectedly favorable growing 
conditions or general economic reversals, that he cannot influence. By 
expected normal prices we mean the prices that would occur in a free 
market in a period of high employment and average growing conditions. 
4) Special programs to assist the farmer who cannot make a reasonable living 
from farming without public subsidy to find a better livelihood in other 
industries. 
5) An advisory Agricultural Board, responsible to the Congress, to work with 
the Secretary of Agriculture in applying agricultural policy, with the tasks 
of protecting over-all policy against crippling exceptions and special 
privileges, of examining agricultural policy in the light of general 
economic conditions and policy, and of moving agricultural programs as 
rapidly as is practical toward their stated objectives. (C.E.D. "Toward a 
Realistic Farm Program," 8-9) 
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Beginning with USDA Secretary Ezra Taft Benson in the Eisenhower of the 
1950s, all USDA Secretaries have liked the recommendations of the C.E.D. regarding 
agriculture policy. The public, however, was not lobbying Congress at this time to pass 
legislation that would radically change the agricultural policy. Why? Possibly it was 
because the public was still operating under the assumptions of the welfare state that had 
been prevalent during the 1930s and 1940s. A change in the policy assumptions did 
occur - later. A comparison of the C.E.D. recommendations to the various farm bills 
beginning in 1971 shows parts of them being enacted each time up to the final part in the 
1996 Freedom to Farm Bill that contained payments not tied to production to entice 
farmers out of agriculture (remove resources- as recommended by the C.E.D. reports). 
The 1996 bill also repealed many sections of the permanent farm legislation, rather than 
just overriding them. (Title 7 Section 7301) 
Nineteen seventy-one appears to be a watershed year. Also enacted that year was 
an omnibus bill revamping the Farm Credit System (FCS), whose single purpose has 
been, and remains to be, to loan money to farmers, farmer cooperatives, and businesses 
involved with farming. There had not been a major overhaul of that system since 1933, 
when the country was in a deep depression. The Farm Credit System gets its funding 
from the money market, where it issues securities sixteen times a year in various 
denominations, interest rates, and time frames. According to its funding corporation in 
New York, a specified list of pre-approved security buyers purchases all of these 
securities at each of the sixteen issue times, keeps most of them, and sells off some. The 
list of specified buyers, supplied by the Funding Corporation, includes the Federal 
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Reserve Banks and the banks and brokerage houses Dye lists in his books as being the 
majority holders of resources in that sector of financial capital and already mentioned in 
connection with the membership of the C.E.D. A group of identified (by Dye) elites is 
responsible for purchasing the securities of the Farm Credit System. By purchasing these 
securities, these entities control the amount of money going into the Farm Credit System 
- capital available for the agriculture sector on a national basis. I have not seen a 
pluralist model yet that looks at how capital is made available to finance agriculture. 
While not speaking of the Farm Credit System in particular, Dye does talk about 
the control of capital by a group of elites as part of his elitist modeling. Control of 
economic resources provides a continuous and important base of power in any society 
because it determines what will be produced, how it will be produced, how much will be 
produced, how much it will cost, how many people will be employed, who will be 
employed, and what their wages will be. Elitist modelers also believe the economic 
controllers determine how goods and services will be distributed, what technology will be 
developed, what profits will be made and how they will be distributed, how much money 
will be available for loans, what interest rates will be charged, and other important 
questions. (Dye, 1976, 19) This conforms with financing arrangements of the FCS. 
The pluralist modelers believe these decisions are made through public activity in 
the market. Therefore, they do not take prior activity of possible influence into account, 
nor do they take notice of how it could possibly be used to influence public opinion if it 
were under the control of a group of elites united in a goal. Why? According to Dahl, 
pluralists take this position because the data cannot be quantified. Dye quantifies it -
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about every four years. Dye reexamines who holds the majority share of the resources in 
each of the sectors identified as being important. He also looks at membership on boards 
and the activities of those boards. His work attempts to provide the quantification Dahl 
says is missing with the elitist modelers' assumptions. It is important for pluralists to 
reexamine their arguments against this influence and stop writing it off as "conspiracy 
theory". They might make important contributions to their own models. 
Something else happened in 1971. The USDA set up an internal committee by 
memorandum dated April 26, 1971, and signed by then USDA Secretary Clifford M. 
Hardin. It was composed of fifteen of its hand picked young executives who were 
department heads and chaired by then Under Secretary Richard Lyng, the number two 
man in the department. These are all positions of power in the Executive Branch 
according to Zaller's elitist model, and incorporated into Dye's regular publication of 
current names. The stated objective of the committee was to "bring together individuals 
from all of the agencies and offices of the USDA to work on issues of department-wide 
concern which are generated by the Office of the Secretary, the agencies, and by the 
Committee itself." (USDA Secretary Clifford Hardin, House Congressional Record June 
21, 1971) Pluralist modelers would consider this insignificant because these individuals 
are not elected to office and do not vote on policy. Pluralist arguments would likely be 
that just because this group was formed at the same time the FCS legislation was being 
significantly rewritten, there is no connection to the upcoming omnibus farm bill that was 
to be written - that to even think so was conspiracy thinking. 
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According to the Dye elitist model, the responsibility for the initiation - actual 
putting into place - of national programs and policies falls primarily upon the president, 
top White House staff, and the heads of executive departments. I doubt that pluralists 
would argue with this observation, since that is the way it was set up to work. That the 
Secretary of Agriculture would choose to establish this committee of USDA department 
heads at this time is interesting. Zaller's elitist model, confirmed by Dye's work, predicts 
this action to be potentially part of a coming policy change to be implemented - and 
neither one of them looks at agricultural policy. Since the public was not demanding a 
change at this time, the pluralists cannot account for it and make no attempt to do so 
because they consider it unimportant. Why, then, did the resulting farm bill legislation 
after that time conform to the reports that came out of the C.E.D. (in 1944, 1956, 1957, 
and 1962) and the 1971 Young Executive Committee of the USDA? What was it that 
caused the change in lobbying coalitions that later supported the farm bill legislation that 
changed agricultural policy? Zaller and Dye combined elitist modelers would say it was 
a combination of the media and school curriculums pushing the ideas behind the reports. 
The Young Executive Report summary states that "shortly after the Committee 
was established and organized, then Secretary of Agriculture Clifford M. Hardin asked it 
to undertake a review of the farm income question and to present its views to him and his 
staff." (Young Executive Report, House Congressional Record June 21, 1972) The 
conclusion of this committee was that the needs of this country could be met by a few 
industrialized and commercialized farming operations. To achieve this, they made the 
following recommendations: 
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1) Agriculture should be viewed as an industry which consumes 
resources, provides employment, and produces goods of value 
to society. 
2) National policy for agriculture should be directed at creating an 
environment which would enable the industry to provide 
adequate supplies of food and fiber at reasonable prices to meet 
domestic needs and to compete in world markets. 
3) National policy should not be directed at assuring any 
particular level of income from farming for the Nation's 
farmers. Income from farming should be of concern only to 
the extent that it affects the industry's ability to produce 
efficiently adequate supplies of food and fiber. 
4) National policy should be directed toward maintaining 
agriculture as a viable industry and not as a way of life. 
5) The agricultural industry should operate with a minimum of 
direct involvement by the public sector. The public sector's 
role should be limited to the establishment and enforcement of 
rules which will allow the industry to maximize its contribution 
to the total welfare of the Nation. 
The Committee recommends that the basic farm programs be 
phased out over a period of 5 years. This should be 
accomplished by reducing the payment per bushel of projected 
yield rather than by restrictions on total payments. Over the 
same 5-year period, non-resource loan rates would be reduced 
to a "disaster price" level for feed and grain crops and wheat 
and to zero for all other crops. (USDA, "Young Executive 
Report," House Congressional Record June 21, 1971, H21904) 
(Emphasis added.) 
The thinking of the Young executive Committee showed a reversion back to 
laissez-faire thinking for farm policy ( and away from the welfare basis that had 
dominated since the permanent farm legislation of the 1930s) at a time when the public 
was not yet lobbying for this change - a change in underlying assumptions. How would 
the Zaller, Dye, Gaventa elitist model of a group of elites, making such a policy decision 
and then influencing the public to accept it, look like if it is applied to the farm 
restructuring of the 1980s? 
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CHAPTER TWO 
OVERVIEW OF U.S. AGRICULTURAL POLICY 
SINCE THE CIVIL WAR - WHAT HAPPENED UP TO 1971 
To understand the nature of the food production system in this country and how it 
relates to social, economic, and political organizations, it is necessary to look at its 
history. The colonial phase will be covered very briefly in order to better focus on the 
time frame from the Civil War to 1971. It was during this latter time that the structure of 
the system in place today was formed. The object of this review is to aid in the 
understanding of the varied approaches to agriculture policy as it adapted to the changing 
requirements of a new and growing country, and particularly to the back and forth debate 
between ideologies controlling policy. During this time, we moved from an entity within 
a mercantile system to an entity within a capitalist global system. 
Regardless of the colonial organization of each colony, it was necessary to 
produce food for survival. This process involved not only the attempts to reproduce 
those familiar foods from the Old World, but also education on new foods already being 
grown and harvested here by the Indians. Depending on the location of each colony, the 
resources available for growing food varied. In other words, climate and soil made a 
difference. For example, New England soil tended to be rocky and thin, and the growing 
season was shorter than more southern locations. Soil was easily exhausted if it was not 
properly cared for, which it was not, generally. Colonists found it more cost-effective to 
keep relocating when soil was exhausted because land was abundant and labor for the 
work was scarce. (Contrast this to the situation in Europe where available land was 
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scarce and labor was abundant.) Because tools were simple - and generally for a single 
person - there was a limit to how much food a single person could produce ( or even 
several single persons working together, because of the shortage oflabor). In a similar 
way of thinking, animals tended to be turned into the woods to feed because it was 
cheaper than building enclosures for them and growing food using scarce resources. 
Those surpluses of food that could be produced were used to trade within the colonial 
system itself ( and occasionally with other countries in a secret fashion) for things not 
produced locally. 1 
The increased number of individuals that could be freed from food production to 
work at other activities allowed for the development of urban centers, supplied with food 
by local producers and some imports, as well as family garden plots. The early history of 
food production in this country, then, tended to revolve around the needs of the local 
geographic area, with some surpluses being shipped to other parts of the colonial system, 
and some imports from other colonies within the system. These markets were only 
accessible when there were developed transportation systems, such as roads, rivers, 
canals, and, later, railroads. The absence of adequate transportation systems kept some 
producers isolated from broader market systems. Even if a surplus could be produced, it 
could not be shipped. 
It is also important to examine the impact of land policy on this process. Land 
was abundant. Each of the colonial charters had systems for land use and/or ownership. 
If individuals wanted to bypass this, they could take off into the wilderness and squat -
taking their chances with the Indians and the vagaries of other possible colonial claims to 
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the area The New England system of organi:zation eventually formed the basis for what 
became the Federal Land Survey System. This was the system used for the orderly 
settlement of the public lands, when they became available. More than an orderly 
settlement of land was at stake. With land in abundance and money in short supply, land 
was used as capital, as a means to other ends. Being able to acquire land was important. 
Those who could acquire more land had access to more capital. Sources discussing the 
political thoughts of the time mention the need for access to capital.2 This settlement 
process was a time of asset acquisition for many. Situations such as this were not 
available in more settled parts of the world. The process for acquiring land was of very 
great interest, not only to a new country with a new inexperienced government, but also 
to the thousands of people flocking in to try to get a share for themselves. Because of the 
more advanced stage of the Industrial Revolution in Europe, the U.S. was perceived to 
have more opportunities, leading to large numbers of immigrants. 
The debate over how to dispose of public lands - and whether or not credit would 
be involved - occupied considerable legislative time. The government did not want to 
get bogged down in the business of selling land; it just wanted to make it available for 
settlement so it could hold the territory. The argument that it also needed the money is 
somewhat accurate, but had that been the sole interest, the land sales would have been 
handled differently than they were. Thus, some opportunities were provided for large 
land speculators ( those with sufficient cash to acquire a section or several sections at a 
time) in the expectation that they would dispose of the land in an orderly fashion. The 
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government saw this as a way to handle sales and settlement without getting directly 
involved beyond the framework. 
While the price per acre seems low to us today, it is necessary to remember it was 
sold in minimum parcels and that farmers had trouble coming up with the cash required 
for payment. In the first place, cash was scarce, especially in frontier areas. In the 
second place, the only way farmers had of acquiring cash was to sell something for cash, 
because usually they just traded either their labor, or what they produced with their labor, 
for what they wanted but did not have. In the third place, it took time to clear land, plow 
it, and harvest a crop to both maintain the farm family and to market for needed cash. 
If the transportation system was not yet developed in the area to facilitate moving 
commodities to market, then the market was not readily available to earn the necessary 
cash for the farm payment. The same problems existed for equipment-new, 
replacements, or upgrades. Many times settlers acquired more land than they could farm 
themselves at one time. Sometimes this was for later use; sometimes it was for 
speculation to raise necessary cash to pay for the part they intended to keep, thus 
technically making them temporary speculators. 
The available farming implements at the time further limited the amount of land 
one individual ( or an individual with various family members) could work - without the 
additional resources of slaves. Think of it in terms of how much one implement could 
accomplish, used by one individual, in numbers of man-hours, in how much time was 
available to accomplish the task. In addition to available labor supplies, crops have 
cycles. It is necessary to work within these cycles. While labor might be available at 
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other times, if it is not available when it is needed during the crop cycle, then the amount 
of possible work decreases ( along with the possible harvest). 
Ideas of how to address these needs-in terms of policy - were influenced by the 
Enlightenment writings and the circumstances existing in the new country. How 
opinions are formed, and who might have an influence in their formation, is important 
because it was a concern even to our Founders when they designed this new model of 
government - knowing that it would be deciding on policies. While the model of 
government was new, the idea that society might essentially be run by a group of elites 
was well known and had been discussed at length during the Enlightenment. In fact, an 
elite was assumed and justified in such writings. Of concern in the writings was the basic 
assumption for how to manage society. 
These ideas were carried over to American thoughts as they struggled to form a 
new country based on some of the ideas of the Enlightenment era that had been so 
influential in the Revolution. As the Constitutional Convention writings show, it was 
expected that the House of Representatives, elected for two-year terms, would be more 
influenced by the emotional whims of the voters, which was a concern. The members of 
the Senate, on the other hand (conceived as a much smaller group), have longer six-year 
terms and function on a different basis than the members of the House, in part to slow 
down the deliberative process in order to minimize emotional responses and emphasize 
deliberate policy decisions. In addition, the membership of the Senate was initially 
selected by state legislatures, whose membership tended to be composed of the natural 
leaders of the communities, thus considered better informed than the average person and 
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part of the lower echelon of the elite. (Afterall, hard working farmers, for example, were 
generally too busy surviving to have time for the type of reading and education 
considered necessary for even lower leadership positions - unless they could afford to 
hire ( or buy) replacement labor to free their time.) The arguments, even then, were 
already sorting themselves out to be either pluralistic or elitist. 
Coming out of a colonial situation of elected representatives ( set up by colonial 
charters), what was added to the new government model was an additional layer of 
representation that was intended to be composed of the more educated and experienced 
thinkers. At the time, there were also the remnants of the fervor of the Revolutionary 
War, and the problems with the decision-making power under the Articles of 
Confederation to deal with during the planning and writing of the Constitution. There 
were deep divisions between the Founders as to whether the form of government should 
be based on the least restraint of individual interests or on the general welfare of 
community interests. While it is easy to teach that the form of Congress in the 
Constitution is a pluralist compromise between the various colonial powers represented at 
the Convention (who were themselves an elite group within colonial society), deeper 
insights into the composition of the members present at the Convention also show the 
additional attempts to structure a more deliberative policy process. (The discussion of 
underlying ideological differences will be saved for another project.) 
The new country under the Constitution struggled with how to help farmers 
through a combination of science and policy that had begun under the Articles of 
Confederation. Both Hamilton and Jefferson, for example believed farmers would 
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benefit from new science and technologies, an Enlightenment idea. By the early 1780s, 
the elite farmers living near urban areas - such as Boston, Philadelphia, and Charleston -
began organizing to achieve greater progress through the use of new scientific ideas and 
technology. They formed societies to promote science in agriculture, offering prizes for 
such things as the importation of purebred livestock, for the discovery of remedies for 
animal and plant diseases, and for improvements in tillage practices. Of course, only 
those farmers with sufficient income already were in a position to take advantage of this 
knowledge. By 1810, these organizations were starting to develop into county fairs. By 
1856, there were 912 local and state organizations; all but 165 located in the North and 
West. (Gates, The Farmer's Age Agriculture 1815-1860, 314) This location is 
significant because it was the North and the West that were most influenced by the ideas 
of Alexander Hamilton, whose community policy had been generally adopted by the new 
Congress under the Constitution, controlled by the Federalists. It was the planters in the 
South (with their slaves and large plantations) who generally supported the Anti-
Federalist ideas of laissez-faire and free trade. While planters supported science, their 
farming methods of large plantations and slaves meant there were fewer of them to make 
the numbers of societies as large as they were in the North and the South, where family 
farmers tended to prevail. This does not mean there were no family farmers in the 
southern states; there were. 
It was the opinion of those associated with these agricultural societies that those 
farmers who were having problems could improve their situation if they would adopt the 
new scientific production methods. This was not a new idea. And, it was not totally 
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wrong, given the labor and other limitations of the time. But the idea had its limits in 
practicality, and that was not always recognized. The same idea was also prevalent 
during the time of the Populists and led to charges that they were against science. This 
thought is still at work today with the idea that those farmers who are having financial 
difficulties are just too inefficient to survive; that they need to adopt the new 
industrialized and commercialized methods being promoted. This is part of a mindset that 
will favor certain responses with regard to agriculture policy. These ideas have been part 
of the mix of thought processes since the Enlightenment, when science was a "hot 
commodity". 
Beginning with the first Washington Administration, influenced by Alexander 
Hamilton and the Federalists, a protective policy was put in place for domestic 
production, including farming. While it is reasonable to say that the intent was to allow 
for the development of domestic industry, Hamilton's writings suggest a deeper meaning. 
His "Report on the Subject of Manufactures" in 1790 clearly lays out the intended policy 
for agriculture and its relationship to other industries of the country. Domestic 
consumption of domestic production was to be relied on over and above foreign trade 
( which Hamilton called fickle). Prices to farmers should be supported for domestic use 
through import tariffs because food was basic to human life and development, and control 
of food was vital to maintain independence. Trade was good, and trade was necessary, 
but not when it hurt the domestic producers. The policy favored supporting the domestic 
sector as the means of benefiting the greatest number of people. (Hamilton, "Report on 
the Subject of Manufactures'', 1790) 
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While the policy did not generate much debate for the first few years of the new 
country ( except with the Anti-Federalists who had limited political power in the new 
government), debate over the policy did increase as the political power of those with a 
free trade vision ( or laissez-faire) increased with the availability of land (providing 
opportunities for development that expanded the number of large capitalists), creating the 
nouveau riche and industrialization. Interestingly enough, it was the Anti-Federalists 
who initially supported this position of free trade and limited government, and were very 
concerned about power relationships between these two visions of organization for 
society, for the economy, and for politics. The planter segment of the Anti-Federalists 
favored a form of capitalism called agrarian capitalism. Agrarian capitalism considered 
industrialized manufacturing a corrupting influence on society, so they did not want it. 
Instead of merchants being the ideal class ( as Adam Smith used in his economic plan for 
capitalism), agrarian capitalists made planters the ideal class and adjusted Smith's plan 
accordingly ( still relying on free trade and limited government to allow for the pursuit of 
individual interests). 
As the country developed and expanded, the production of various agricultural 
commodities shifted from region to region. With new areas being opened and exploited, 
older areas found themselves adapting their agricultural production to what they could 
reasonably produce for a profit. As the business of production became industrialized and 
corporatized, the market changed from being local to meeting the needs of larger, better-
organized, capitalist entities in urban areas - and outside of the country. It is this process 
of industrializing and corporatizing agriculture that will be discussed in more detail for 
50 
the remainder of this chapter because it is part of a vision for agriculture that drives 
policy decisions and debates over ideology. Capital was required to bring this 
industrialized and corporatized situation about. Who would get the capital, who would 
be guided by the new science, who would be deemed ''successful''? 
In 1862, after the southern states had pulled their representatives out of Congress, 
those members remaining were finally able to pass several acts they had been trying to 
enact over the objections of southerners. The Homestead Act was one of these. The 
remaining public lands were going to be given away to homesteaders. (These would be 
family farms, not the plantations with slave labor envisioned by the southerners, who 
wanted to expand their system in the hope of more political power.) Southerners had 
opposed free homesteading as a power play to out maneuver them and their vision of how 
the country should be organized according to agrarian capitalism. The Morrill Act was 
another piece of legislation. Section 301 of Title 7 United States Code Annotated 
established the land grant college system, whose mission was to research new science and 
technologies for agriculture.3 At this time the USDA was given cabinet status because 
of the recognized importance of the expanded science and land settlement to the 
development of the country. In addition to these acts, the railroads were finally 
successful in receiving assistance from Congress to expand their networks into the 
unsettled areas of the country, providing transportation links from coast to coast- as well 
as new settlements providing urban markets for the increased production from the new 
farming enterprises. These would be crucial in both uniting the entire country as well as 
developing a marketing network for the anticipated expanded development. 
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These railroads worked hard to attract settlers to the areas where they had 
received large grants of land Some bonanz.a farms were established in some areas to 
show what the "efficient" and heavily capitalized industrialized and corporatized 
production could accomplish. These were also used to attract settlers and investment to 
the areas so the railroads could sell their land and realize large profits. In Texas, the only 
state to keep its public lands when entering the Union, these vast areas were used to graze 
free-range cattle for large urban markets. Very large cattle feeding operations developed 
there, most depending on the free grazing areas. 
These acts, combined, provided an education system, a marketing system, and 
resources for those who could take advantage of it. By 1887, the Hatch Act was passed 
and became Section 36 la of Title 7 United States Code Annotated. It established the 
Experiment Stations to show farmers how to use the information coming out of the land 
grant colleges. 4 The perception was that only a few farmers were willing to adopt these 
new ideas. Some farmers did not trust the information coming from the new system. 
Some did not have the means of incorporating the new ideas. Several methods were tried 
to get farmers to use the new techniques and technologies, but it was not until county 
agents were used to identify those farmers who were both financially able and likely to 
employ the new methods and serve as examples to others in their area that dissemination 
increased 
Those farmers willing to be a part of this new system were then organized into 
local farm bureaus by the county agents, and formed a symbiotic relationship with these 
county agents - even paying some of their salaries - until the Smith-Lever Act of 1914 
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formally set up the Extension Service to help people living in rural areas and provide 
sufficient funding for salaries. The idea being promoted was that rural residents needed 
help with new knowledge in science in order to improve their situations; it was not the 
farm policy that was responsible for the problems. (This idea of the farm policy being 
free from blame was not accepted by everyone. Some, such as the Populists, believed the 
policy was causing the problem by feeding into the trusts that were taking control of all 
levels of production through their control over technology and resources.) In 1918, the 
county farm bureaus held a national meeting and decided to form the American Farm 
Bureau Federation. (Grant McConnel, The Decline of Agrarian Democracy) 
The struggle for wealth reshaped the economy after Reconstruction. This was the 
time that saw the rise of monopolies, combinations, and trusts - laissez-faire, success 
myth, social Darwinism. In 1888, a Senate Special Committee was established to look 
into charges of a combination taking advantage of the laissez-faire situation to reduce 
prices to farmers and ranchers while raising prices to consumers. All members of the 
committee agreed that prices to producers were depressed in all parts of the country. In 
addition, all members agreed that the methods of selling beef ( and other produce) had 
been entirely revolutionized in the previous ten years, due to new technologies. 
Control of the new technologies by some industrialists had allowed concentration 
in the market to exist at a few key points: Chicago, Kansas City, Omaha, St. Louis, 
Cincinnati, and Pittsburg, with the controlling market in Chicago. This revolution was 
caused by the construction of railroads and subsequent combination between these 
corporations and the establishment of stockyards owned by parties controlling the 
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railroads upon whose links the yards were located In addition to this combinatio~ a few 
individuals in Chicago ( engaged in the business of packing and dressed beef) had been 
able, through their enormous capital, to centralize and control the livestock business and 
were moving to control the movement of fruits and vegetables by controlling refrigerator 
cars. The men in Chicago dominated the price of livestock in this country. ( 1888 Senate 
Special Committee report on the transportation and sale of meat products in the United 
States." Senate Report No. 829, 51 Congress, Session I) This is what the Populists saw 
and objected to - not the new technologies themselves - according to the research of 
Norman Pollack. 
The meat trust, in its defense, claimed that prices were low to producers because 
of overproduction, a point that is generally used today by people writing of this era. The 
Senate Special Committee, however, used USDA figures to show that the amount of meat 
produced per person had been declining as the prices to producers were declining. In 
addition, the charge by the meat trust of over-marketing (too much investment in large 
cattle feeding operations) was refuted by pointing out the increased demand by new 
processes such as canning, as well as by the increased population flooding into the 
country. It is significant to note that in spite of the findings of the Senate Special 
Committee, they did not believe Congress had the authority to regulate trusts and 
combinations. (Senate Special Committee report on the transportation and sale of meat 
products in the United States." Senate Report No. 829, 51 Congress, Session I.) Such a 
conclusion was indicative of the dominant mindset of the time. The Sherman Antitrust 
Act was passed two years later, but saw limited success until the early 1900s. This was 
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the time of the rise of the nouveau riche ( taking advantage of the available policies to 
build up their capital), who thenjoined the group of old wealth elites because of their 
control of significant resources. Dye elitist modelers cite these differences between the 
source of wealth for the two groups as responsible for the ideological split. Pluralists 
don't talk about it because they say it cannot be quantified 
The debates over policy became every bit as intense as the original debates 
between those who became Federalists and those who became Anti-Federalists over the 
form of the Constitution versus the form of the Articles of Confederation. The reason for 
both cases is because they went to the heart of differing visions for social, political, and 
economic organization. Writings during this time show that there were at least two very 
distinct, divergent, views regarding the role of government to represent the interests of 
the citizens in their relationships with very large powerful trusts and monopolies working 
through their corporations. Two of these sources are Ray Ginger's Age of Excess: The 
United States from 1877 to 1914, and Sidney Fine's Laissez-faire and the General 
Welfare State: A Study of Conflict in American Thought 1865-1901. These were 
economic policy discussions, which went to the heart of whose interests would be 
represented by elected officials. 
In addition, Norman Pollack's research into the Populist Movement shows that 
their primary source documents are replete with ideological discussions of this very 
nature. The Populists were one of the constituencies very much in favor of curbing the 
power of what they termed the "robber baron trusts", which they saw as "robbing" them 
of their profits in agriculture and driving many of them out of business. Those applying 
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the Dye elitist model would say that at the time when debate over economic policy - and 
its resulting impact on social policy - was at its height, the rise of the Populist Movement 
and the spread of their influence - especially if they succeeded in uniting with the 
socialist movements in the urban areas - represented a potential threat to the stability of 
power for the much smaller group of elites who controlled the lion' s share of resources 
during the time of industrialization. Based on this assumption, such an elitist modeler 
would conclude that if you were in such a group of elites, even conflicted with others in 
your group ideologically, it is possible that you might unite to avoid the potential threat to 
your power represented by the rise and spread of the Populist Movement ( with new 
leaders), which was an independent entity from the group of elites. Such an explanation 
is not "off the wall." It is used to explain the French coming to help the American 
colonists fight against England during the Revolution. Such a phenomenon is known as: 
the enemy of my enemy is my friend. Pluralist modelers would say there were not a 
sufficient number of constituents to influence Congress to change the policy, in spite of 
the Populist and the Socialist movements and their political activities. 
The Populist Movement became powerful enough that the Democratic Party 
eventually subsumed it, in 1896, thus bleeding off its power and effectively neutralizing 
it. It is not coincidental that when the county agent system was being formed as a pilot 
project around 1900, each was asked to identify those farmers in their assigned counties 
who would adopt the new technologies and ideas coming from the land grant college 
system and the Experiment Stations - and who had not been involved in the Populist 
Movement. Grant Mcconnel documents this using primary sources in his book on the 
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demise of family farmers. A Dye elitist modeler would conclude that the potential 
political power from the spread of the ideology of the Populist Movement was not wanted 
in the new structure being put together to promote the industrialization and 
commercialization of agriculture through science: the USDA system of land grant 
colleges, Experiment Stations, later the Extension Service, and in what became the 
American Farm Bureau ( composed of those farmers identified by the county agents as 
favorable to the proposed system and not partial to Populist ideology). 
While the stated policy of this structure is the promotion of science in agriculture, 
it was foreseen even by the Populists (as well as by people today) that control of the 
resulting science and technology played into the hands of the industrialists and could be 
used as leverage against the farmers who did not want to be a part of that controlled 
system, even though they might want the science and new technology. Pollock 
acknowledges in his book that the Populists were not against using science and new 
technologies; they were against the control over them that came with the ideas. This is a 
debate yet today. It is of note here that land grant colleges (mostly universities now) 
have offices for the American Farm Bureau on their campuses in various departments, 
but they do not have representatives of other farm organizations. In addition, the ideas of 
the other farm organizations are only included in classroom curriculum to the extent that 
they existed, are "outmoded" or sometimes "radical," or, if nothing else, they are 
uninformed. The message to students is that they should not adopt these ideas. 
It is of interest here that in spite of the reaction to members and ideas of the 
Populist Movement in their time, the change to popular election of Senators - as called 
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for in their platform - came about in 1913. Another plank - that called for changes in 
farm policy that would work to curb the power of large corporations and improve income 
to farmers- also came about, in 1938. The reason this is interesting is that these 
important arguments of the Movement only occurred after the potential political power 
had been neutralized. To a dye elitist modeler, this is of interest. 
The late 1800s had been a time of the rise of very wealthy industrialists, laissez-
faire thinking, monopolies, and trusts - one of the identified divisional splits in the group 
of elites by those using the either the Zaller or Dye elitist model. There was considerable 
discussion at the time over this issue, as books and media publications of the time 
indicate. The rationale behind the political planks of the Populists stems from their 
concept of man and his relationship to society and politics. They rejected the prevailing 
popular ideologies of the day: the success myth, social Darwinism, and laissez-faire 
(seeing these as part of the pursuit of self-interest by the wealthy industrialists they saw 
taking advantage of people to increase their own wealth and keep it). The experience of 
the Populists had been that these prevailing ideologies were myths that worked to the 
advantage of the few over the many. The position of the government was an insistence 
on the very least legal restraint compatible with law and order. This position resulted in 
some individuals being able to assert themselves and their increasing comparative 
advantage over and above the many, which the Populists and Socialists saw and objected 
to. 
The Populists favored the best interests of community responsibility. In Populist 
eyes, individualism kept people competing against each other (rather than cooperating 
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with each other), thus allowing for the creation of monopoly capitalism, where the 
corporation (under the control of a few) took over control of the community due to its 
control of vast resources. Populists insisted that the greatest welfare of the individual 
within community was more important than the greatest welfare of the corporation ( under 
the control of a few). This applied ideology can be tracked back through the 
Enlightenment as it developed approaches to both government and capitalism (with its 
tendency to commodify everything), but it is not the subject of this paper. 
According to Norman Pollack's analysis of Populist writings, they were 
concerned with the consequences of power more than the personalities or motivations of 
successful men. As long as monopolies could control the markets, in which the farmers 
participated, that was the critical point. Populists also saw a difference between technical 
progress and its translation into material well-being. While technology can serve man, it 
can also be used to insure a greater domination over him. Used as a means of 
domination, progress in such a defective society becomes harmful by intensifying the 
defects. (Pollack, Populists, 22) While Populists did not subscribe to the ideologies of 
individualism, competition, and social Darwinism, their response was not to reject it, but 
to redefine the relationship between the individual and society. Their reason for doing 
this was because those three ideas held the individual alone responsible for his plight -
perseverance, ruthlessness, or industry determined one's position in the social structure. 
According to Populists, it was society itself that was to blame for human 
impoverishment, not the inadequacies of any individual. (Pollack, Populists, 23-4) This 
idea of personal responsibility was part of the Protestant work ethic that Adam Smith 
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attached to his proposals for industrial capitalism, with its economic, social and political 
organiz.ation. (Smith, Wealth of Nations, 1776) There were other philosophes from the 
Enlightenment who wrote about an approach to capitalism that would have been 
consistent with the ideology of the Populists. While there is a vast array of literature on 
this, and the ideas of the Populists are consistent with this body of work, it is not a part of 
this paper, nor is it a part of public school curriculum. 
The Populists wanted atomized man, with his individual responsibility, to give 
way to social man, with his social responsibility. Society had to be changed. (Pollack, 
Populists, 24) As it was going at the time of the Movement, the individual was becoming 
subordinated both to the dominant groups in society and to the productive system itself. 
Competition was only another name for war. (Pollack, Populists, 27) The personal 
stories of these new fast-rising industrialists show that they rose from humble beginnings, 
taking advantage of the Industrial Revolution taking place in America at the time, and 
made fortunes. They felt no responsibility to anyone. For this reason, they held 
individuals responsible for their own situations in life, consistent with the accepted Adam 
Smith industrial approach to capitalism. 
The recommendations made by the Populists for direct election of U.S. Senators, 
for government regulation of critical businesses such as utilities, and for their subtreasury 
plan to ensure more income to farmers to get them out of their "debt bondage" was their 
way of changing the laissez-faire system to encompass greater social responsibility for 
the greater good of society. If U.S. Senators were elected directly by the voters, just like 
U.S. Representatives, then the average person had a better chance of outvoting the elites 
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- at least that was the thinking. Governments should act in the interests of the people, not 
corporations, therefore government regulation of businesses such as utilities made sense 
to Populists. 
Application of ideas from Zaller, Dye, and Gaventa would say that the attacks on 
Populists at the time for being radical were political ploys to destroy their growing 
power; a power that could cause increasing instability at a time when there was already 
debate over policy within the group of elites themselves ( as evidenced by the writings on 
welfare versus laissez-faire), and the socialist movement was organizing in urban areas as 
another front. It was also a time when the Catholic Church (a world wide body) officially 
began its social justice movement by promoting unionizing and state intervention to 
protect the poor and the weak ( 1891 ). 5 Europe, in fact, saw the formation of several 
church-based political parties promoting these ideas. These actions indicated a 
destabilizing situation that needed to be addressed. The attacks on the Populists today, 
as being radical, must be seen in terms of an ideological disagreement. Because the 
prevailing ideology today supports what the Populists were fighting against, the view of 
"malcontents" tends to stick with them. 
We now have the direct election of U.S. Senators, we have been through the 
government regulation of some public works for the better interests of society, we have 
laws against monopolies (though not currently well enforced), and the Populist 
subtreasury plan was the basis for the permanent farm legislation of 1938 (although it has 
been partially repealed and is being overridden by farm bills). The general education 
today, as well as the major news media, is focused on the embracing of the underlying 
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assumptions that the Populists were against: the success myth, laissez-faire, social 
Darwinism. Dye elitist modelers would explain this as a sufficient number of nouveau 
riche to overrule the welfare tendencies of the old wealth, the situation has stabilized, or 
one could say that we are in a cycle of individualism, as pluralists would likely put forth. 
Dye elitist modelers explain the return to welfare during the 1930s - in addition to the 
problem with stability - as the children of the nouveau riche coming of age and revolting 
against their parents to join with the ideas of the old wealth toward welfare. That is not 
an "off-the-wall'' explanation. Cultural historians cite the rebellious youth of the 1960s 
and 1970s as children of the generation who lived through the Depression and who went 
to war, who now wanted a change of values. It is possible that the cycle of expansion 
today, through computer technologies, has created a system much like the previous 
Industrial Revolution with the resulting individualism mindset prevailing. Whether the 
children of these nouveau riche react as the earlier ones did to return to an idea of welfare 
remains to be seen. 
The point is that when people, imbued with this individualism mindset, study the 
Populist ideology, they tend to interpret it according to their own thought structures. This 
accounts for the use of identifiers such as "radical" and "losers" and "self-serving." In a 
similar manner, pluralists do not take account of the overarching power structure that was 
at stake if the Populists were to succeed in their power drive to make the changes they 
were promoting. Application of the Dye elitist model would say such changes would 
have caused a redistribution of capital and power. Pluralists would say the Populists 
failed to win a sufficient number to their cause for elected officials to take it up. If that 
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was the case, why were their ideas picked up later, after they were no longer a power to 
be reckoned with? 
Grant Mcconnel has shown that primary source documents specifically wanted 
those associated with the Populist Movement excluded from being a part of the new 
county farm bureaus, which were a part of the structure being put into place for 
agriculture: USDA, land grant college system, Experiment Stations, Extension Service, 
County Agents, and Farm Bureau. The question becomes one of: why? If the new 
science and technologies were supposed to be for the benefit of agriculture, in order to 
improve the well-being of farmers, then why were some organized and others excluded 
from the organizing, not that they were excluded from the knowledge? Even though the 
official charges against the Populists were that they did not believe in these new ideas, 
Pollack's research of their primary source documents shows that they did, in fact, believe 
in the new ideas - it was the resulting control they were against. A Dye elitist modeler 
would say that the answer lies with the fact that the underlying assumptions of the 
Populists, in terms of the relationships in society, were not the underlying assumptions of 
this new structure. In other words, it was a counter-organizing measure. 
The new USDA/ et. al. structure was going to promote different assumptions with 
a different vision for agriculture and the individual's relationship to society and politics. 
County agents, living in their county, could easily identify those farmers in their county 
who would be willing to be a part of this new program from those who held Populist 
beliefs. From this, a structure was built to promote certain values and, when necessary, 
be trotted out to lobby for corresponding "proper" legislation. This continues to happen 
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today. Other farm groups, not aligned with such an encompassing structure of power, and 
with more Populist ideas, are dying out because they are not a part of a larger structure. 
The American Farm Bureau ( which is on the campuses of land grant universities) lives on 
and fulfills is mission to promote the industrialization and coroporatiz.ation of agriculture. 
While there may have been an ongoing debate, during the time of the Populists 
and up through World War I, regarding trusts, monopolies, laissez-faire, and the proper 
role of government, it is significant that no enforceable actions were taken in agriculture 
until the Packers and Stockyards Act of 1921. While the Sherman Antitrust Act was 
passed in 1890, the agriculture sector was excluded. In addition, Theodore Roosevelt's 
infamous trust trials of the early 1900s were far from 100% successful. (Benedict, Farm 
Policies of the United States 1790-1950) The problem was the ideological belief that 
business should be encouraged rather than regulated for the benefit of society. 
In 1919, after World War I, the House held a hearing to look into the meat trust. 
By 1921, minds were beginning to change. Whether this change was caused by the war 
or by a changing belief system (as some cultural historians maintain), nevertheless, there 
was a change. Perhaps the trusts had gone too far with their actions and it was time for 
the government to step in. The Packers and Stockyards Act of 1921 put some teeth into 
the Sherman Antitrust Act, regarding its application to agriculture, that succeeded in 
breaking up the meat trust ( something that had been in existence for forty years). Smaller 
packers returned and did not disappear until the late 1970s and early 1980s. 
As the depression of the 1930s set in, there was another change of mind regarding 
whether or not the government should get involved in the situation. In other words, the 
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stability of the situation was deteriorating. A hearing held at Iowa State College ( a land 
grant institution) in 1932 shows a lot of testimony specifically citing the financial straits 
of farmers, the impact to rural areas and banks, and calling for government action. ( The 
Agricultural Emergency in Iowa, 1932) Zaller and Dye elitist modelers would say this 
was an expert entity - part of the structure - testifying that some action was needed on 
the part of government. In 1933, the Agricultural Adjustment Act was passed, based on 
the Progressive recommendations of the 1920s. The New Deal legislation, generally, had 
the attitude that the government had a societal responsibility and that everyone needed to 
work together for the well-being of all. Historians of this era do cite more of a 
togetherness that is believed to be responsible for helping many survive. 
The 1933 Agricultural Adjustment Act had its enemies. The Supreme Court 
agreed that it was unconstitutional in 1936. In fact, the Supreme Court found much of the 
New Deal legislation unconstitutional because of its social bent. Because there were still 
serious destabilizing problems throughout the country at the time of the Supreme Court 
pronouncements, Congress responded to the set back with the Soil Conservation Act, and 
followed that with the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938. In this revised versio~ the 
government would enter the market to buy sufficient amounts of enumerated 
commodities to raise the price for producers, and then store it for sale later when it was 
hoped prices would be higher. This was similar in theory to the cooperative system the 
Populists tried to set up for themselves and then wanted the government to take over and 
issue currency backed by the commodities (their subreasury plan). Because this was a 
much less efficient way of handling the pricing, it left open the door for change down the 
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road using the government financial outlays as the excuse.6 The parity price calculation 
for determining the support price can be found in Section 1301, Title 7 United States 
Code Annotated. Subsection C sets out the calculation for the parity index: 
The "parity indexn, as of any date, shall be the ratio of (i) the general level 
of prices for articles and services that farmers buy, wages paid hired farm 
labor, interest on farm indebtedness secured by farm real estate, and taxes 
on farm real estate, for the calendar month ending last before such date to 
(ii) the general level of such prices, wages, rates, and taxes during the 
period January 1910 to December 1914, inclusive. 
As this section shows, the parity price is an average price per enumerated 
commodity covered by the legislation. The idea is to prop up the buying power of 
farmers for production used domestically ( and part of the calculation for standard of 
living). Rural areas depend on the purchasing power of farmers and support services for 
their services and tax base. The idea was to limit the unrest in the rural areas, which 
involved more than farmers. Those producers ~o could keep their expenses below the 
calculated average parity price would have a greater income, and those producers who 
had higher than average expenses would have a lower income ( and in some cases a loss). 
This measure was not going to keep all farmers in business, as many insist it would and 
did, but it did keep more farmers in agriculture than industrialists and coporatists wanted. 
There were also provisions for action to be taken by the government if imports 
were sufficient to interfere with the domestic price. The stated objective was to bring the 
standard of living in rural areas up to the national average and keep it there. Stability, 
through reduction of disparity ( a community thought process), was the goal. An intended 
use of some of the government-purchased commodities was to help feed low-income 
people which, interestingly enough, would have been consistent with Hamilton's idea of 
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relying on domestic production to furnish domestic needs. Section 2011 of Title 7 United 
States Code Annotated states the policy of Congress: 
It is declared to be the policy of Congress, in order to promote the general 
welfare, to safeguard the health and well-being of the Nation's population 
by raising levels of nutrition among low-income households. Congress 
finds that the limited food purchasing power of low-income households 
contributes to hunger and malnutrition among members of such 
households. Congress further finds that increased utilization of food in 
establishing and maintaining adequate national levels of nutrition will 
promote the distribution in a beneficial manner of the Nation's agricultural 
abundance and will strengthen the Nation's agricultural economy, as well 
as result in more orderly marketing and distribution of foods. 
From the passage of the 1938 act through World War II, Congress tinkered with 
adjustments to the price supports of the enumerated commodities and increased the list of 
covered commodities, but there was generally high production with high prices. The 
Emergency Price Control Act of 1942 (the same year as the establishment of the C.E.D.) 
set support prices at 110% of parity. The Steagall Amendment added more commodities 
to the enumerated list and said the support would stay at 90% of parity until two years 
after the war ended. In the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1948, support prices could 
vary between 60% and 90% of parity, based on a base period of the prior ten years 
(making it a rolling average for the calculation of parity, rather than a ratio based on 
1910-1914 ). During this time the farm debt was paid down to its lowest level since the 
USDA began keeping records. 
In 1942 the Committee for Economic Development was formed for the purpose of 
war planning and economic rebuilding after the war. It was composed of two hundred 
representatives of major businesses. According to information contained in the C.E.D. 
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reports, the Committee composition was generally _Presidents or Board Chairmen of 
corporations and Presidents of universities, who were chosen for their individual 
capacities rather than as representatives of any particular interests. The reports 
themselves stated that the representatives united scholarship with business judgment and 
experience in analyzing the issues and developing recommendations to resolve the 
economic problems that constantly arise in a dynamic and democratic society. Zaller and 
Dye elitist modelers would say this is clearly stating that their purpose for existence is to 
bring elites together for the purpose of policy planning. Also according to their reports: 
Through this business-academic partnership, the C.E.D. endeavored to develop 
policy statements and other research products that commended themselves as 
guides to public and business policy. These statements were for use as texts in 
college economic and political science courses and in management training courses. 
They were also for consideration and discussion by newspaper and magazine 
editors, columnists and commentators, and for distribution abroad to promote 
better understanding of the American economic system. (Emphasis added.) This 
declaration by the Committee fits the elitist model used by Zaller and Dye for influence 
more than it fits the pluralistic models of Dahl, Amol~ Hansen, or Browne, who all 
believe it is the groups of political activists that determine policy at the congressional 
level. The fact that these policy reports were put together by a group of people who were 
chosen for this purpose and then made available to those who are in a position to 
influence opinions and information processing - media and schools - illustrates for Zaller 
and Dye elitist modelers how thoughts can be influenced for the general public and those 
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who take positions on issues and then speak to their congressional representatives. The 
first C.E.D. report on agricultural policy was put forth in 1944 before the public was 
lobbying Congress for a change in policy, and long before Zaller and Dye began writing 
on their elitist models. The following excerpts are from the 1944 report on agriculture 
policy: 
A major issue centers around the question of how completely we shall rely 
on private action, and what role the government shall play in regulating 
it. ... Government properly should be the guardian of the public interest. It 
can become so to the fullest extent only if powerful pressure groups are 
unable to enlist the government as a partner in enforcing their will on the 
others. One of our most challenging needs is to harness the potential 
statesmanship among leaders of agriculture, labor, and industry so as to 
cooperate in building a greater society rather than tearing the society 
asunder. (C.E.D. report from 1944, 6) 
This statement appears to be calling for the government to not respond to groups similar 
in nature to the Populists. "Harnessing the potential statesmanship among leaders of 
agriculture, labor, and industry'' includes only those with the politically-correct vision of 
the future. In the case of agriculture policy, the leaders would involve those from the 
USDA-Farm Bureau structure. They will be the disseminators of information on the 
desired policy change. The C.E.D. went on to say: 
We can raise our standard of living still further as a higher 
proportion of our people are put to work providing non-agricultural 
goods and services, leaving only enough in commercial farming to 
produce abundant food by efficient methods. One of the barriers to 
migration from farming, especially from depressed regions, is lack of 
training in city occupations for those who have inadequate opportunities in 
agriculture ... .Improved education in farm communities, designed to fit 
many rural youth for city occupations, is a national as well as a state and 
local responsibility. There also needs to be an expansion of employment 
exchanges and vocational guidance services so that farm people can learn 
of non-farm opportunities. Establishment of industrial plants and 
commercial agencies in rural areas, wherever conditions are such that they 
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can operate economically, has much to commend it. Not only does it 
enable more people to combine non-agricultural employment with rural 
residence, but it expedites migration out of commercial agriculture, 
since the movement proceeds most readily if farm people do not have to 
go far to find suitablejobs.(C.E.D. report of 1944, 11) (Emphasis added.) 
It is obvious from the above excerpts that the C.E.D. is not only promoting the 
idea that science will solve the problems of agriculture (not a new concept), but they also 
want to eliminate the parity support prices that they see keeping too many resources in 
farming. This means that they intend to force what they see as surplus resources out of 
farming by reducing their income and training them to work in urban occupations. 
Whether one is an elitist modeler or a pluralist modeler, there is no need to interpret the 
above direct quote as to intent. The goal of the C.E.D. was for the country to move 
completely into industrialized corporatized farming. This is an indication of a change in 
goals and assumptions from welfare for the community good to individualism for 
maximized efficiency and profits. This change was being recommended just six years 
after the passage of the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938, when the situation was 
once again considered stable. 
USDA secretaries, beginning with the Eisenhower Administration's Ezra Taft 
Bensen, favored the recommendations of the C.E.D. Getting them implemented was 
another problem. It would take time to get a sufficient number of the public to see this 
change in the desired perspective in order to avoid a backlash that might be destabilizing. 
Another Populist-like movement was not seen as desirable. The Zaller and Dye elitist 
modeler would say that processing people through school curriculums that promoted this 
change, and carefully changing the tone of media reporting could accomplish this task 
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over time. Pluralists would see the change in constituency lobbying of Congress as it 
changed over time because that is what they examine. 
The Eisenhower Administration lobbied for more flexible prices, achieved in 
1954, while P.L. 480 called for expanding exports. Support prices started edging 
downward Between 1951 and 1956, agricultural prices declined twenty-three percent. 
(Remember that the 1948 act had already said prices would range between 60%-90% of 
parity, based on a rolling average. This meant that prices were going to be below a parity 
price to maintain income to the farming operation and the farm family in order to keep 
them at a level with the rest of the sectors in the economy. Of course prices would 
decline through these measures.) After passing farm legislation in 1954, 1956, 1958, 
1961, 1962, 1964, Congress decided in 1965 to stop the frequent farm bills in favor of a 
periodic omnibus bill that began overriding the permanent farm legislation, rather than 
tinkering with it. During this time, in 1956, 1957, and 1962, the C. E.D. issued three 
more policy papers for agriculture with the same recommendations as the 1944 policy 
paper. The following excerpts show how they wanted schools and the news media to 
perceive the farm situation: 
Farmers can protect their economic position by leaving the farm to 
earn income elsewhere, or by earning more non-farm income while 
remaining on the farm. As a matter of fact, farm people have been 
making both of these adjustments to a marked degree in the past few 
years. While total farm income declined 31% [from 1947 to 1954], 
average farm income per worker declined by less than 10%, as a result of 
a decline in the number of farmers. And the growing opportunity of farm 
families to obtain non-farm employment brought about an 11 % increase in 
total average income of farm residents between 1947 and 1954 .... The fact 
that the average income of farm families is substantially lower than the 
average income of non-farm families is symptomatic of a serious national 
problem, but it is not a problem that can be solved by higher price 
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supports ... . The acute income problem, which drags down the average is 
the $2,200 per family earned by about 1.6 million families who sell only 
9% of all farm products, and especially the $1,600 average incomes of 
700,000 families within this group who sell only 2% of the product. 
These families produce so little that no feasible increase in farm prices 
would greatly alleviate their income problem. (C.E.D. report of 1956, 
11) (Emphasis added.) 
Several million farmers have too few productive resources to earn a 
good living from farming without public subsidy. Farmers have been 
leaving farming in large numbers in recent years. Public policy should 
assist and encourage this move, so that the farm industry, like any 
other industry, can be made up of a number of producers who can 
make a good living at market prices. (C.E.D. report of 1957, 8) 
(Emphasis added.) 
This is the fourth statement on American agriculture by the Research and 
Policy Committee of CED. The use of too many resources in agriculture, 
the unsatisfactory income of many farmers, the excessive government 
expenditures and the network of government controls that result from 
failure to solve the farm problem would by themselves explain our 
continuing interest in this subject. The important lessons of agriculture 
are that the free market is precious and that its preservation requires 
positive action. These lessons apply far beyond agriculture. (C.E.D. 
report of 1962, 8) (Emphasis added.) 
Politically, in order to change from "what is" to something new, it is usually first 
necessary to attack the "what is." Afterall, why make a change if there is nothing wrong? 
This is how you minimize opposition. To break the power of the Populists, they were 
attacked to minimize their growing political power, and then their party was co-opted by 
the Democrats. In the case of the farm policy and legislation, the permanent farm 
legislation (based on Populist recommendations) needed to be attacked to minimize 
dissent for implementing a different system based on different underlying assumptions. 
Dye elitist modelers would say this was all being foreshadowed by a change in dominant 
ideology. This is politics. Headed into 1971, the C.E.D. had put together a 
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business/education partnership de_signed specifically to influence what was being taught 
in the classrooms. The media was also included to situate the context for their reporting 
to that desired by the C.E.D. The policy recommendations coming from the C.E.D. 
actually stated this as the use for the reports. 
By 1965, a "test run" of a farm bill that began on a specific date, expired on a 
specific date, and that overrode parts of the permanent farm legislation had successfully 
passed Congress and was signed into law by President Johnson. ("Test runs" such as this 
are common maneuvers in both Congress as well as in state legislatures.) 7 The stage was 
set for the rest of the C.E.D. recommendations (cited in Chapter One). We already know 
that the C.E.D. reports came prior to pluralist activity asking Congress to change the 
agricultural policy, because these began in 1944. Why would a group of business people 
- whose stated purpose for issuing the policy papers was to influence classroom 
curriculums and the media - have any reason to respond to pluralist lobbying for a 
change in agricultural policy in 1944? 
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Notes 
1 There are several sources for the history of farming in early America. One of these is Howard S. 
Russell's A Long, Deep Furrow, 1976. Paul W. Gates' the Farmer's Age Agriculh1re 1815-1860, 1960. 
2 Sources include both Federalist and Anti-Federalist writers because of the perceived relationship of land 
to involved citizens. 
3 "There is granted to the several States, for the purpose hereinafter mentioned in this subchapter, an 
amount of public land, to be apportioned to each State a quantity equal to thirty thousand acres for each 
Senator and Representative in Congress to which the States are respectively entitled by the apportionment 
under the census of 1860:" 
4 "!'State agriculture experiment station' means a department which shall have been established, under 
direction of the college or university or agricultural departments of the college or university in each State in 
accordance with an Act approved July 2, 1862, entitled 'An Act donating public lands to the several States 
and Territories which may provide colleges for the benefit of agriculture and the mechanics ast. '; or such 
other substantially equivalent arrangements as any State shall determine." Section 361b goes on to say: "It 
is further the policy of the Congress to promote the efficient production, marketing, distribution, and 
utilization of products of the farm as essential to the health and welfare of our people and to promote a 
sound and prosperous agriculture and rural life as indispensable to the maintenance of maximum 
employment and national prosperity and security. It is also the intent of Congress to assure agriculture a 
position in research equal to that of industry, which will aid in maintaining an equitable balance between 
agriculture and other segments of our economy. It shall be the object and duty of the State agricultural 
experiment stations through the expenditure of the appropriations hereinafter authorized to conduct original 
and other researches, investigations, and experiments bearing directly on and contributing to the 
establishment and maintenance of a permanent and effective agricultural industry of the United States, 
including researches basic to the problems of agriculture in its broadest aspects, and such investigations as 
have for their purpose the development and improvement of the rural home and rural life and the maximum 
contribution by agriculture to the welfare of the consumer, as may be deemed advisable, having due regard 
to the varying conditions and needs of the respective States." 
5 The Catholic Church had been a part of the ideological debate active during the Enlightenment, but it was 
not until Pope Leo XIIl wrote and published the papal encyclical Rerom Novarom that the church officially 
launched its social justice movement. That it coincided with the influence of Adam Smith's capitalism and 
laissez-faire thinking is not an accident, given the ideology of the church. 
6 Iowa agricultural economist, E.E. Kennedy, says in his book The Fed and the Farmer (Pismo Beach: 
Edward E. Kennedy, 1983) that at the time the 1933 legislation was passed, he had been lobbying for a cost 
of production price on domestic production that would have been a basic price, not one achieved through a 
tax nor by the government entering the market in an attempt to prop up the domestic rice. He thought they 
had achieved this understanding with the Roosevelt Administration, when suddenly the tax proposal was 
presented and passed by Congress. It was his opinion that someone(s) outside the view of those who were 
lobbying achieved this coup. 
7 I was personally a part of this strategy at the state level in regard to open school enrollment. Being a 
lobbyist at both the state and national levels, I am familiar with this strategy. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
THE USDA "YOUNG EXECUTIVE REPORT" 
In the House minutes of June 21, 1972, is a curious entry by Rep. John Melcher 
(D-Mont. ). He asked for permission to speak; he reported that there was a great deal of 
interest in the USDA's recommendation that agriculture programs be eliminated. Since 
he had inserted a summary of the Young Executive Committee's report in the June 15 
minutes, his office had been besieged with requests for copies. He accused the USDA 
with limiting the numbers available because they did not want the information to get out 
prior to the upcoming election. In fact, the USDA had gone so far as to add a disclaimer 
on the front of the report: 
Report of the Young Executives Committee has no official status in the 
U.S. Department of Agriculture. It was developed independently by the 
15 members of the Committee of young employees of the Department. 
The opinions are those of the members of the Committee. The views 
expressed are not representative of the policy of the Department. (USDA, 
"Young Executive Report,n House Congressional Record June 21, 1972, 
H21734) 
The interesting thing about this disclaimer is that - contrary to its content - the 
Committee was set up by memorandum No. 1727 from the USDA Secretary Clifford M. 
Hardin dated April 26, 1971 . Therefore, the young executives from various departments 
within the USDA were not acting independently. They were brought together by the 
USDA Secretary. (Emphasis added.) Not only did the USDA Secretary set up the 
Committee, he sent them a memo asking them to specifically undertake a review of the 
farm income problem. According to the memorandmn, their report was to be presented 
to him and his staff. So, the head of the USDA set up a committee to be composed of 
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specific positions within the departmen~ and then gave them a specific task, asking that 
the results be presented to the Secretary and his staff That does not sound like 
something these department heads came up with independently, as the disclaimer asserts. 
Based on the assignment given to them by the USDA secretary, this committee requested 
information before writing their report. Unfortunately, except for a couple off ootnotes in 
the report, that information is only available from the USDA - that wants to be paid to 
provide it (making it unlikely that the average person will be reading the details). It is the 
content of this report and its conclusions that are the subject of this chapter. 
The pluralist model (whichever one is selected) begins with the assumption that 
Congress enacts policy based on lobbying by various groups of constituents. There is no 
mention of Congress asking the USDA to set up this committee and undertake an 
examination of the farm income problem, although the problem was well known. While 
an examination of the farm income problem would be plausible, given the drop in farm 
income and the upcoming work to fashion the second omnibus farm bill, public talk up to 
that time was mostly centered on how to adjust the permanent farm legislation. 
According to the elitist model, as set forth and quantified by Dye, the federal 
bureaucracy, and the professional federal executives who supervise it, are in a unique 
influential position. This group advises the president; they present and defend legislative 
recommendations before Congress; and they supervise the daily decisions of 
departments, agencies, commissions, and boards that influence the lives of all of us. The 
upper echelon among these bureaucrats is comprised of th·e secretaries, assistant 
secretaries, and undersecretaries of the Cabinet departments. These are some of the 
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people Dye names every time he updates his information ( which is about every four 
years). (Dye, Who's Running America?, 1976, 61) It is exactly these people in the 
USDA who were responsible for the organiz.ation of the Young Executive Committee and 
its resulting report on how to resolve the farm income problem through the restructuring 
of agriculture. 
The Brookings Institute (identified as one of the top policy think tanks in the Dye 
elitist model) did a study of these bureaucrats, for the administrations of FDR through 
Johnson. They found that thirty-six percent came up through the ranks of the 
government, twenty-six percent were recruited from law, twenty-four percent came from 
business, seven percent came from education, and seven percent came from a variety of 
other fields. A plurality were career bureaucrats. (David T. Stanley, Dean E. Mann, and 
Jameson W. Doig, Men Who Govern, 1967) This means that, to rise through the ranks, 
they have learned what they need to do to be politically correct in order to remain career 
bureaucrats. Dye explains in his work how difficult it is for these bureaucrats to rise up 
through the ranks. These individuals are aware that in order to just stay where they are in 
the power hierarchy - when others are also fighting their way up through the ranks - they 
need to maintain a certain mindset. It is their job to figure out what is expected of them, 
and act accordingly, in their decision-making. For this reason, it is not conceivable that 
they would make a recommendation that they perceived was going against the wishes of 
those who had power over the future of their careers. Because of this, a conclusion that 
would call for a complete restructuring of an economic sector must be seen as something 
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these individuals believed to be not only feasible but desired by their superiors who 
organized the committee and gave it its assignment. 
According to Zaller and Dye elitist modelers, in addition to these professional 
bureaucrats, there are also policy clusters in Washington. Policy clusters are alliances of 
leaders from executive agencies, congressional committees, and private business and 
industry. Committee chairmen are key members of these policy clusters. One such 
cluster for agriculture would include the chairmen of the House and Senate committees 
on agriculture, the Secretary of Agriculture, and the leaders of the American Farm 
Bureau Federation - all of whom work closely with agribusinesses. According to the 
Dye elitist modelers, these alliances of congressional, executive, and private elites 
determine most public policy within their area of concern. (Dye, Who 's Running 
America, 1976, 71) Pluralist modelers see these clusters differently- as both specialists 
and those responsible for establishing the policy desired by the groups of lobbyists and 
passed by Congress. The difference between models appears to be one of timing: which 
comes first. 
The memorandum from USDA Secretary Clifford Hardin stated that there were 
many talented young executives throughout the department who were in positions of high 
responsibility within the agency. In order to increase their involvement in broad 
interagency matters, Hardin was bringing them together by establishing a Young 
Executive Committee. Membership on the Committee was through nomination by the 
agencies and the Secretary's staff. Each agency administrator and office director could 
nominate one to three individuals on a nationwide basis. Nominees had to be 40 years of 
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age or under, and GS-12 or above-indicating those who had been around long enough to 
learn the ropes and who were anxious to rise through the ranks, as opposed to being close 
to retirement. The Secretary personally set these qualifications. When you are a manager, 
you set qualifications for a reason. It is not conspiracy theory to suggest that Hardin's 
reason for stating these qualifications was that he expected a certain type of individual to 
serve on the committee. Members would be appointed for one .fiscal year, with the 
exception of the first group whose appointments would run through the end of fiscal year 
1972. The Committee would be chaired by the Under Secretary. In the case of this first 
Committee, the Under Secretary was Richard Lyng, who later went on to become 
Secretary of Agriculture during the fann restructuring of the 1980s. This note is of 
interest, given the recommendations contained in the committee report. 
Rep. Melcher (D-Montana) had some further comments regarding the USDA and 
farm policy. According to these comments, USDA Secretary Butz1 boasted that he had 
killed Melcher's bill to raise loan rates on grains twenty-five percent by getting in touch 
with the "financial angels" of some of the members of the Senate Agriculture Committee. 
(House Congressional Minutes June 21, 1972, 21734) This supports the work of Dye 
elitist modelers, indicating a financial elite who can influence desired legislation with 
Congress by either contributing to campaigns or by withholding campaign contributions. 
It does not support pluralist models of members of Congress responding to constituents 
because Melcher is from Montana, a state whose constituents would have been interested 
in the bill to to raise loan rates on grains. Since the Secretary was contacting the 
"financial angels" of the Senate Agriculture Committee, it could be assumed that Rep. 
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Melcher's bill was passed by the House, and the Secretary wanted to make sure it did not 
get out of the Agriculture Committee in the Senate. It also puts the Secretary of 
Agriculture in the position of trying to influence legislation he does not see as desirable. 
In the case cited, an increase in loan rates (part of the permanent legislation) was not 
wanted by the Secretary of Agriculture, indicating a lack of support for the permanent 
legislation by the Secretary of Agriculture. I am not sure how pluralist modelers would 
explain this, since the Secretary of Agriculture does not have a constituency on which to 
rely for election to his position. Since pluralist modelers would be looking at actions of 
Congress for policy decisions, they would most likely be looking at what constituency 
was lobbying Congress. 
Melcher went on to say that the young executives' proposal to put bankrupt 
farmers on welfare was not new. The House Agriculture Committee had been told more 
than a year previously (in 1971) that the President's family assistance plan, the new 
welfare bill, should be enacted to take care of the poor farmers while discussions of a 
new farm program were ongoing. This comment acknowledges that there were 
discussions in progress concerning the writing of the upcoming omnibus farm bill. 
According to Melcher, many of the policies in the "Young Executive Report" were 
policies that had been going to the Agriculture Committee for some time in piecemeal -
from the Executive Department, not constituents. Melcher wanted to find out who had 
lectured the Young Executive Committee at their seminars, and what their instructions 
were when they prepared the report; to what extent were they influenced by Secretary 
Hardin and/or Secretary Butz. He said he made this last observation because there may 
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have been extenuating circumstances for members of the Committee - it would be 
difficult, for example, for a young man with a family to defy his boss. With these 
comments, Melcher was acknowledging an assumption that Dye elitist modelers use 
regarding influence through resources. Since pluralist modelers confine themselves to 
Congress in matters of policy, it is doubtful they would be interested in the work of this 
committee or the questions Melcher was posing. While these were good questions being 
asked by Melcher, the answers to them are not in the congressional minutes; the USDA 
has some of the information, but they will not make it public. The following were 
members of the Committee: 
Gene S. Bergoffen, Executive Secretary, Forrest Service 
Allan S. Johnson, Project Leader, Economic Research Service 
Carol G. Alexander, National Agricultural Library 
Karen L. Berke, Agricultural Marketing Service 
John S. Bottum, Extension Service 
John E. Carson, Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service 
Betty L. Dotson, Food and Nutrition Service 
Avram E. Guroff, Economic Research Service 
Clarence R. Hanna, Office of Information Systems 
James E. Haskell, Farmer Cooperative Service 
Homer R. Hilner, Soil Conservation Service 
Jerome A Miles, Director, Office of Budget and Finance 
Gerald G. Poppe, Federal Crop Insurance Corporation 
William L. Ruble, Agricultural Stabilization and Conservation Service 
Robert P. Shiner, Commodity Exchange Authority 
After the committee was charged with examining the farm income problem, it 
began an information-gathering phase. Seminars were arranged with a number of 
Department officials and others outside the Department. In November of 1971, the 
Committee divided into sub-teams of three members each for the purpose of visiting four 
areas of the country to talk with farmers, food producers, and others involved with 
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agriculture. The teams visited South Central Texas, Mississippi, Washington, and 
California. Of interest here would be the extent to which knowledge of the hearings was 
disseminated and who testified. That information is part of the USDA files that are only 
available through purchase and a trip to Washington, D.C. 
The final report does explain that committee viewpoints from the hearing 
information were developed through position papers written by individual committee 
members and discussed by the Committee as a whole. This action would eliminate any 
"rogue" individual writing a position that was not deemed politically correct. Once the 
Committee adopted points of view, individual members were assigned report sections to 
draft that incorporated the position of the Committee. Melcher, s desire to know who 
talked to the committee and what information they were given is understandable. Were 
these people with the land grant institutions, the Extension Service, the American Farm 
Bureau Federation? These would be considered the "experts" on the topic under 
discussion, and certainly part of the structure with the USDA We can deduce that they 
were not with the farm groups such as National Farmers Organization because that group 
only circulated the report once it heard of its existence through the efforts of Rep. 
Melcher. The stated goal of the NFO, when it published the report, was to inform 
farmers that the USDA had a goal of removing price supports. Notice that they said "the 
USDA has a goal.,, How is the USDA goal a pluralist action of constituents lobbying 
Congress? If the public was widely lobbying Congress at this time for a complete change 
in farm policy, why was the disclaimer added by the USDA to the final report in 1972 (an 
election year)? Was it possible that Republican members of Congress who were up for 
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reelection saw some concern with being associated with a report that came from a 
Republican Administration and advocated the restructuring of agriculture? If their 
constituents wanted this change, shouldn't they have been campaigning on it? Zaller and 
Dye elitist modelers would find this of interest. 
In the summary of the Young Executive Report, the Committee concluded that 
the statistics developed and published by the USDA "misrepresent" ( their term) the 
economic conditions of the farm sector. This "misrepresentation" occurs because the 
concern has been farm income ( a focus of the permanent farm legislation written to bring 
the standard of farm living up to standards in other sectors through income support), 
which the Committee considered a "welfare" concept (their term). Notice that welfare 
concepts were in vogue during the 1930s when the legislation was written as part of the 
New Deal legislation package. 
The Committee made note of the fact that the mission of the USDA is stated in 
terms of equitable returns to resources ( emphasis added), which they considered a 
business concept. It is important to note the stated mission of the USDA, according to 
the Committee, because the difference denotes the difference in ideological approach to 
agricultural policy. This illustrates the difference between the individual pursuit of self-
interest to maximize profits and returns versus the welfare of community as a whole, with 
individuals within the community benefiting as a result. This had been a cyclical debate 
in this country, as previously pointed out in both Chapter One and Chapter Two. A 
cultural history of the time period 1971 shows an upheaval in society with ideologies "at 
war" with each other, just as they had been almost one hundred years before. The more 
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recent ''war" began in the late 1960s and continued into the l 970s. While this does not 
mean that the upheaval resulted in heavy lobbying of Congress to change agriculture 
policy in 1971, it does show that a change might be possible because ideologies were 
clashing. Zaller and Dye elitist modelers would find this connection of interest. Pluralist 
modelers would only look at any changes in the coalitions lobbying Congress. 
With the ~ommittee making a distinction in new goals for agriculture policy, and 
using these as underlying assumptions for a change in policy away from income 
maintenance, three recommendations were made that were designed to restructure 
agriculture in order to industrialize and commercialize it to maximize returns to 
resources: 
1) change the definition of a farm to be an enterprise with annual sales of$5,000 or 
more; 
2) eliminate the parity price ratio; 
3) develop a set of statistics that would allow comparison of return to all assets used in 
the production of each agricultural commodity to what those resources could earn 
outside of agriculture. 
The Committee report noted that there was no public agreement on the basic goals 
for agriculture, and that their view might not be a majority view. (Emphasis added) 
This is an important note because it signifies that they are not responding to a pluralist 
move to change agricultural policy. Why would they be responding to a pluralist move 
for a change when these were not elected officials but career bureaucrats? If they had 
been responding to a pluralist constituency lobbying Congress for a change in policy, 
84 
why would they bother to state in the report that their view was not likely to be a majority 
view? Nevertheless, the committee emphasized in their report that there was a need 
for agreement on the desired characteristics for agriculture. (Emphasis added) The 
Committee is emphasizing here that they agree a change is needed for agriculture policy, 
but it will take some time to get the necessary broader public agreement in order to get 
the policy changed to what they believe it should be in order to maximize returns to 
resources-which they say is the stated mission of the USDA. 
I do not know how a pluralist modeler would interpret this comment in the report, 
given the circumstances of the time. Possibly they would say that a minority was 
lobbying for a change in agriculture policy; at such time that a majority lobbies for such a 
change, the policy would be changed No discussion would be included as to media 
content on the issue, nor curriculum content ( which did undergo a change to indicate a 
positive attitude for eliminating price supports). Perhaps Zaller and Dye elitist modelers, 
on the other hand, would interpret this note to possibly be an acknowledgement that there 
was still work to do with the public in order to avoid instability through a negative public 
reaction to a sudden policy change. Even children show evidence of grasping the 
necessity of laying ground-work with their parents prior to making a request for 
something big. A complete change of policy, with different underlying assumptions, 
would be considered big 
Zaller' s elitist model talks about the steps necessary to accomplish such a change 
with the public: awareness of the issue ( the reception axiom), necessary contextual 
information in order to establish a relationship between the argument and the 
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predisposition (the resistance axiom), the closeness of the alert to the issue (the 
accessibility axiom), and the response axiom. Dye also talks about this in his 
quantification of Zaller' s model. According to Zaller and Dye, changes in the media and 
school curriculums precede changes in the public's mind Removing price supports 
would be a big change. Other than the American Farm Burea~ what farm group at this 
time was supporting the removal of price supports? None. With farmers in the minority 
of the populatiol\ the only reason for the Committee to note that their view might not be 
in the majority would be if it was believed a majority of the remaining constituents was 
not yet in favor of a change in agricultural policy. 
On a whole, those at the top are well-educate~ affluent, urbal\ WASP, and male. 
There is a strong tendency to agree on goals, only varying on the means. (Dye, Who 's 
Running America?, 1976, 165) With this general unanimity in min~ coupled with the 
probable desire on the part of the committee members to remain career bureaucrats, the 
policy framework recommended by the Committee had five characteristics: 
1) The proper view of agriculture is as an industry that consumes resources, provides 
employment, and produces goods of value to society. 
2) The national policy should be aimed at creating an environment that would enable the 
industry to meet the domestic needs at reasonable prices and compete in world 
markets. 
3) The national policy should not be to maintain a level of income from farming for 
farmers. 
4) National policy should be directed at maintaining a viable industry, not a way oflife. 
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5) Agriculture, as an industry, should operate with a minimum of direct involvement by 
the public (meaning through the government) - they wanted free trade. 
As a result of these recommendations by the Committee, the present fann 
programs - based on supporting farm income - were deemed inconsistent with the 
Committee's policy framework for U.S. agriculture. It is understandable why this 
difference would be present; the desired goals had been changed by the Committee - or 
at least acknowledged that the mission of the USDA was maximizing return on resources. 
The permanent legislation focused on maintaining income to farmers and rural areas. 
How did this get approved if it was contrary to the stated mission of the USDA? Dye 
elitist modelers would say the instability of the times made it necessary. The 
recommended new policy would be a focus on profits and return on resources. This was 
the business approach, whose focus was the individual pursuit of self-interest in order to 
maximize profits. (Minimal government interference was seen as desirable, just as it had 
been in the late 1800s and early 1900s.) The Committee recommended that the basic farm 
programs be phased out over a period of five years. That would be a very rapid change. 
There would definitely be repercussions to make such a change in five years. Although, 
when the farm restructuring of the 1980s is examine<L it will be noted that it was 
generally accomplished in the five-year time frame. 
To accomplish this restructuring, the Committee recommended that the 
payment per bushel of projected yield be consistently reduced. (Emphasis added.) 
During this same five-year period, non-resource loan rates should be reduced to a disaster 
level for feed grain crops and wheat, and to zero for all other crops. (Emphasis added.) 
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In addition, it was also recommended that there be no enactment of legislation that would 
exempt farmer associations from antitrust laws. The stated objective of this 
recommendation was to bring about a balance in the relative bargaining strength of 
producers and buyers ( who were agribusinesses) without compromising existing antitrust 
laws or seriously disrupting the marketing and distribution system. Of note here is that 
farmer cooperatives already had exemption from anti trust laws, enacted in the 1920s. It 
appears that the Committee wanted these laws either repealed or not enforced This 
would likely weaken the bargaining power of farmer cooperatives as they went head to 
head with the multinational companies with greater resources at their disposal. 
This was the same situation the members of the Populist Movement had found 
themselves in when they established their farmer coops and tried to bargain with the 
trusts. This means that the Committee was calling for a return to the conditions of the 
late 1800s and early 1900s, using the same type of argument of laissez-faire versus 
welfare. What an interesting turn of events! There was going to be another ideological 
cycle change. I believe a Dye elitist modeler explanation of why the elites would want 
such a change at this time would be either a perceived calming of the instability faced 
during the Great Depression of the 1930s when the permanent farm policy was adopted, 
or a change in the composition of the group of elites so that those who favored the 
laissez-faire return to resources approach outnumbered those who favored the welfare 
approach. If pluralist modelers looked at this change in thinking at all, they would 
simply note a change in the groupings of lobbyists. 
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Rather than supporting farm income, the Committee made the following seven 
recommendations for helping rural areas: 
1) Immediate enactment of the Family Assistance Plan (the welfare plan referred to by 
Rep. Melcher). 
2) Improved education and vocational training in rural areas (for jobs outside of 
farming, as previously recommended by the C.E.D. reports). 
3) Tax incentives to industries willing to locate plants in rural areas (to provide the 
alternative employment). 
4) A credit system for construction of community services, facilities, and housing. 
5) Availability of technical advisors, trained in community planning, for rural 
communities ( which land grant colleges and the Extension Service happen to 
provide). 
6) Development of a national framework for land use planning to guide future growth 
and development (away from agriculture so there is not a return to small farmers). 
7) Establishment of a Cabinet-level official to be designated to coordinate rural 
development efforts ( away from agriculture in order to better fit with the new policy). 
What this report is recognizing is that when the number of farmers is drastically 
reduced, which lowering their income and redefining a farm would do, then there will be 
more people hurting in rural areas than just farmers. The 1932 report from Iowa State 
College previously noted this problem just prior to the passage of the first new 
agricultural legislation based on welfare in 1933. One of the things that is not necessarily 
seen as desirable by elected officials, according to pluralists, is the political activation of 
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segments of non-active society to an extent that it could be destabilizing. There might be 
political repercussions, as history has shown. Therefore, rural development projects 
would be necessary to soften the otherwise-harsh economic reality of restructuring 
agriculture. The Zaller elitist modelers would see this somewhat differently. In a 
possible application of this model, the media and curriculums could use the new 
assumption of return to resources to portray the farmer as causing his own demise 
through his "inefficiency" - his reliance on government welfare through income 
maintenance. In other words, if the farmer is not making enough money from his 
farming operation (without income support), then he is too inefficient to survive - do not 
feel sorry for him because it is his own fault. This is the applied difference in perception 
with a change in underlying assumptions. In fact, this is the way USDA reports are now 
written. The debate between welfare versus laissez-faire and individualism versus 
community continues to this day because the underlying assumptions of each are part of 
the ideologies that compose the acculturation of all individuals. In addition to the known 
socialist and communist groups still politically active, the Catholic Church is still writing 
its encyclicals defining the relationship of man to capital and society in terms of 
community interest and working with other like-minded groups for political changes. 
Reports issued by the "farm structure" of USDA et. al. emphasize the amount 
produced by mega-operators as a percentage to the whole for the sector, as well as the 
percentage of their income to the sector as a whole. This makes it appear that because 
they are big, they are efficient, which is one of the underlying assumptions being taught 
in curriculums and reported on in the media. This "bigness" is caused by the 
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industrialization and commercialization of the sector, which is portrayed as desirable 
because it maximizes returns on resources. The perception is that these "efficienf' 
operators are doing it right; smaller operators are not. 
Applying the Zaller and Dye elitist models to this thinking might result in a 
message to the rest of the people in the rural area, not involved in the "inefficienf' 
farming operation but feeling the impact to the tax and service base of losing several 
farmers: "Do not feel sorry for these inefficient farmers, we have something better for 
you if you want to work for it..,, Dye elitist modelers might identify this as divide-and-
conquer tactics at work through the control of resources. Pluralists do not appear to take 
this into account when they attempt to model the decisions made by Congress. They 
would ask what groups are lobbying and for what are they lobbying. 
According to Zaller and Dye, the media has the ability to communicate the 
political agenda for the nation through its coverage of the issue. They can exert influence 
by defining the problems and providing the options for solution. The issues that receive 
the most media attention become the ones that the general public comes to view as 
important. In addition to this attention, the media places the news in a context. While 
visual images are shown on the screen to convey specific connotations, a voice-over 
explains the importance of the news item. Masses are also socialized by the media 
through news reporting, entertainment programming, and product advertising. Cultural 
historians have already written about this, citing the 1920s as an example of how society 
was changed from one with a focus on production and necessary-use consumption into 
one with a focus on increased consumption as the new "modem"' way to think., through 
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the content of the media, entertainment, and advertising. (Roland Marchand, Advertising 
the American Dream, 1985) In fact, research shows that this was done using the 
knowledge learned from the government CPI committee to "sell'' the public on World 
War I. To apply these now-well-developed skills to politics today is not a stretch. 
Therefore, how the issue of farm problems is reported and portrayed to the public helps to 
pave the way for a policy change. (Dye, Top Down Policymaking, 2000, 110) 
It can also account for many of the changes in lobbying groups that pluralist 
modelers examine for policy changes. Through mergers, there is a concentration in 
control of news outlets and entertainment that makes them a concentrated part of the 
power elite in the Dye elitist model. Their reporting of the farm restructuring would be 
crucial to whether it could proceed to completion, or if other actions would be necessary 
to address the destabilization, according to elitist modelers. For example, if the media 
were using headlines that were alarmist about the number of farmers being put out of 
business, it could be expected that the public would respond accordingly. With the 
concentration of control, it becomes easier to coordinate the manner in which the news is 
reported - or if it is reported at all. This concentration is no different than the 
concentration of agribusinesses and the asserted control exercised by them over the farm 
sector. 
The question now is: were the Young Executive Committee recommendations 
consistent with the recommendations of the C.E.D.? The Committee policy framework 
of viewing agriculture as an industry that needs a proper business environment, rather 
than a way of life whose income needs to be supported is consistent with that of the 
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C.E.D., whose members were representatives of200 businesses and education. The 
recommendation of the Committee to phase out basic farm programs over a period of five 
years is consistent with the C.E.D. recommendation to remove price support programs, 
retire land, and dispose of surpluses - although there was no timeframe in the C.E.D. 
policy papers. The Committee plan to reeducate and retrain farmers to do other work is 
similarly consistent with C.E.D. recommendations for special programs to help farmers 
find a "better" livelihood outside of farming. Therefore, the "Young Executive Report" 
is consistent with the recommendations of the C.E.D. for restructuring agriculture. 
In addition to these activities in 1971, there were other happenings. The first of 
four Regional Rural Development Centers was established at Iowa State University. The 
purpose of these regional centers, as stated by their own literature, was to serve as unique 
regional and national networks to catalyze, facilitate, and evaluate research and 
educational programs with the potential to improve the social and economic well-being of 
individuals in small towns and rural places in ways that did not involve a dependence on 
agriculture. The other three were later set up at Pennsylvania State University, 
Mississippi State University, and Oregon State University. 
Each of these centers is administered by a joint agreement between USDA and a 
host institution operating for the Extension Services and the Experiment Stations in the 
region. Core funding comes from the Cooperative State Research, Education, and 
Extension service (CSREES) and each region's land-grant universities. In addition to 
this, there has been increased funding from other Federal and State agencies, private 
foundations, and public interests ( who contribute funding in support of special approved 
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programs). A board of directors for each Center is composed of administrators and 
faculty from the institutions, representatives of CSREES and the Economic Research 
Service (ERS) of the USDA- as well as representatives from public and private 
agencies. These Centers serve as leaders and primary facilitators for rural 
development research, education, and policy dialogues. Zaller and Dye elitist modelers 
would point to this structure as lower echelon elites working to get the public to accept 
their chosen outcome. The resources of these Centers are targeted on five key issues: 
1) Improving economic competitiveness, diversity, and adaptability of small and/or rural 
communities. 
2) Linking natural resource industries with community and environmental resources. 
3) Increasing community capacity to deal with change. 
4) Enhancing self-reliance of families and communities. 
5) Facilitating development of policies that enhance the well-being of rural people and 
small towns. 2 
I do not believe the sudden formation of the Young Executive Committee in April 
1971 just happened out of the blue. There was a reason it was organized by the USDA 
Secretary at that time. Also happening in 1971 was the first major overhaul of the Fann 
Credit System since 1933 - the time of the first approval of the permanent farm 
legislation. This Fann Credit System overhaul was well-planned. In May of 1969, a 27-
member national commission was formed to study the lending system and recommend 
changes. Representatives on this commission included national farm and cooperative 
organizations, farm communicators ( including Lauren Soth of the Des Moines Register), 
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the agricultural representative on the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 
and representative policy-makers from the Farm Credit System banks (which would be 
comparable positions to the members of the later Young Executive Committee). The 
members of this committee were in positions to have been familiar with the policy 
recommendations for agriculture coming from the C.E.D. because they were part of the 
groupings that would have received copies of the policy papers. 
The objective recommended by the 1969 Commission was: 
Recognizing that a prosperous, productive agriculture is essential to a free 
Nation, it is the objective of the farmer-owned, cooperative Farm Credit 
System to improve the income and well-being of American farmers and 
ranchers by furnishing adequate and constructive credit and closely related 
services to them, their cooperatives, and selected farm related businesses 
necessary for efficient farm operations. (Emphasis added.) (Farm Credit 
Administration, "The Report of the Commission on Agricultural Credit," 
1970) 
Zaller and Dye elitist modelers would say that Lauren Soth was a significant 
media representative on the Commission. He was an agricultural economist (Iowa State 
University graduate) and editorial writer for the Des Moines Register (the only state 
newspaper in Iowa, a rural state). He had also published several books. His articles, 
book reviews and speeches are located in the Parks Library (Special Collections) at Iowa 
State University. Some of his books include: Farm Trouble ( 1957), The Farm Pol icy 
game Play by Play (1989), Farm Policy for the Sixties (1961), Agriculture in an 
Industrial Society (1966). He would be an ideal writer for the new policy in the only 
state paper in a major farm state. 
The significant changes made by the 1971 Fann Credit Act regarded an increase 
in the amount of money borrowers could borrow against the appraised value of their 
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collateral. Another change was the way the collateral was appraised for loan purposes 
(which made even more money available for credit). (Public Law 92-181; Stat.583 S. 
1483) Both of the changes meant that borrowers could borrow more money, if it was 
available by investors buying Farm Credit System securities. This did two important 
things during the 1970s and 1980s. 
During the 1970s, when the value of farm land was going up, the Farm Credit 
System had money to loan, on a larger percentage of the inflated appraised asset values, 
then other lenders for the sector. This availability of loan finds occurred because of the 
different funding mechanisms between banks and the Farm Credit System. It also 
occurred because of the decision by institutional investors to purchase the securities being 
offered by the Farm Credit System over the financial instruments being offered by the 
banks. Had this pre-designated group of approved buyers of Farm Credit System 
securities not been buying the securities, the money would not have been available to 
loan. It is important to remember here that Dye identifies the pre-approved buyers of 
these securities as elites who control the majority of assets in the finance capital sector. 
The Farm Credit System is a national entity formed for the sole purpose of 
agricultural lending. It is composed of local service centers that are bound together 
through joint liability for the system securities and the loss sharing agreements of the 
entire system. What this means is that other entities within the system must contribute to 
significant losses of one of their own. This works something like a group of individuals 
contributing to pay for the losses of one of their members (something like a Lloyd's of 
London). The loss policy did not always work this way, but was changed in the l 970s. 
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This change provided additional security out of profits ( over and above the security of the 
loan collateral) for the securities being offered in the money market and being purchased 
by a handful of approved institutional investors. The investors were, thus, guaranteed to 
get their money back. Therefore, the money flowing into the Farm Credit System and 
contributing to the driving up of the land values and the borrower debt was backed by the 
loan collateral of the borrowers and the assets and earnings of all of the entities within the 
system. The approval for this took place at the same time as the 1971 Farm Credit 
overhaul and the Young Executive Committee. (W. Gifford Hoag, The Farm Credit 
System, 1976)3 
When Federal Reserve Chairman, Paul Volcker, began raising interest rates in the 
late 1970s, interest rates to the farmers went up faster with other farm lenders than they 
did with the Fann Credit System, due to the nature of the funding mechanism of the 
system and the manner in which the averaged security rates are used to determine the 
lending rates. 4 The lending rate is determined by averaging the rates on the outstanding 
securities and adding a spread for operating expenses at each level within the system. In 
addition to this calculation, in the 1980s, the system approved a differential lending rate 
whereby loan credit factors ( that worked like a credit rating) were used to charge 
different rates to different borrowers. The effect of this was to increase the interest rates 
for those borrowers who were going to be liquidated (because they could not pay the 
interest and the large principle payments on the increased debt with the lower farm 
income they were receiving due to the farm bills lowering farm income in order to 
restructure). 
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This interest differential was also at work between farm lenders. Those with 
higher rates lost borrowers to the Farm Credit System. A big demand developed for 
credit from the Farm Credit System to buy farm land at inflated prices. The Farm Credit 
System once again took over market share of both short and long-term farm loans. 5 
These loans could not cashfl.ow, nor could they project to cashflow at the time they were 
made; they were rationalized by the Federal Reserve advice to loan against rising equity.6 
By the end of the 1980s, as the forced farm liquidations were ebbing, both the Farm 
Credit System and the Federal Reserve acknowledged that the advice to borrow against 
the inflated equity was a contributing factor to the problem of the 1980s. It should be 
pointed out that no investors of Farm Credit System securities lost so much as a penny 
from the restructuring of agriculture during the 1980s, according to their financial reports. 
Equity during inflation happens almost automatically due to the increasing asset 
values versus the debt against the values. When the farm land bubble burst, the deflating 
values drove the equity into a negative position against the increased amount owed. 
Because a positive cashfl.ow was not possible even prior to the reversal of farm land 
values, many loans were in trouble. The interest differential within the Farm Credit 
System allowed the segregating of loans so that those targeted for liquidation actually 
worked to subsidize the reduced interest on those at the lower rate. 7 In a book published 
in 1992 by five former members of the system, they acknowledged they had been 
"aggressive'' in liquidating loans. They justified these actions by claiming it was 
necessary to save the system. (Kenneth L. Peoples, et. al., Anatomy of an American 
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Agricultural Credit Crisis, 1992) By "saving the system/' they meant the security 
investors, not the farmer/borrowers. 
In a 1999 thesis, I analyzed the annual reports of the system itself to show that 
this rationale was a hoax, just as the Special Senate Committee of 1888 used the USDA 
statistics to show that the rationale of too much meat was a hoax for justifying lower 
prices to the producers. An analysis of the financial reports of the system showed that 
had the system not been aggressive in its lending in the late 1970s and early 1980s, had it 
not changed its loss loan accounting methods in 1985, and had it not been aggressive in 
forcing liquidations to pay the securities, the amount of posted actual losses would have 
been half ( or possibly less, depending on adjustments for the differential interest rates 
charged). 8 It also helped that the only other farm lender close in size to the Farm Credit 
System was the Farmer's Home Administration of the USDA. Their loan guarantee plan 
served as a "clearing house" for a percentage of the farm loans whose liquidation all at 
once would have clogged the entire farm system and caused even grater problems than 
actually occurred. Normally the FmHA loans (high-risk in nature) should have been the 
first ones liquidated, but due to a convenient court decision, they were delayed until after 
the other farm lenders had completed their loan portfolio restructuring. This means that 
the money made available to both of these national entities ( which, combined, dominated 
both short-term and long-term farm lending) was a controlled factor through specifically-
issued securities. This fits Dye's model of controlled resources. 
This information is important to this paper because the policy recommendations 
of the C.E.D. and the Young Executive Committee up through 1971 were implemented 
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into farm bills after that time, thus reducing farm income at a time when farm debt was 
increasing. In addition to this, the Federal Reserve was recommending that farmers 
borrow against equity created by inflated values because that was the "new modem way" 
( the efficient way) of conducting business by maximizing returns on resources. In fact, 
one of the writers of these recommendations for the Federal Reserve was a man named 
Marvin Duncan. Duncan then went on to become one of three top directors of the newly-
restructured Farm Credit Administration (FCA) during the 1980s farm restructuring when 
the farmer directors were thrown off the top national board and replaced with 
"professional'' business people. (This is similar to Richard Lyng, chairman of the Young 
Executive Committee, becoming Secretary of Agriculture during the 1980s farm crisis.) 
It is the FCA that is responsible for recommending legislation to Congress for the system, 
for writing policy for the Farm Credit System, and for auditing system institutions to be 
sure they are complying with the policy and procedures. Zaller and Dye elitist modelers 
would account for this control as elites moving toward a desired outcome. The pluralist 
models do not; in fact, they do not look at it. 
An application of the Dye elitist model might say there is a reason farmers could 
not be left in control of their own system (the Farm Credit System), one that had 
supposedly been created to help them meet their needs. Farmers would have delayed the 
liquidations and worked to change the policy when they realized what was happening. 
Instead, new bylaws were enacted that called for removing farmers from the boards if 
their loans got into financial difficulty and "for cause" - meaning if they tried to fight 
what was happening during the restructuring. With the system having market share of 
farm loans, the actions they took affected other farm lenders. Other lenders were not in a 
position to pick up the loans being liquidated by the Farm Credit System. Further, 
liquidated assets were a depressing effect on the values of farm assets used as collateral 
by all farm lenders, severely limiting borrowing capacity and/or forcing corresponding 
liquidations. 
In addition to these activities in the Farm Credit System, if parity had been 
allowed to work instead of being overridden by farm bills that were forcing down farm 
income, the interest expense, usually the largest expense in a farming operation, would 
have been covered by the parity index calculation. This action would have guaranteed 
that those operations that kept other expenses in line would receive a domestic 
commodity price that covered these inflated expenses. If the price supports ( reduced 
from a parity calculation) had remained sufficiently high enough, some of the interest 
expense could have been covered. As the support prices went down while the expenses 
were going up, liquidations could hardly be avoided. The reduced interest rate for some 
almost guaranteed they would not be liquidated. This was acknowledged to have been 
happening by virtue of the fact that the Federal Reserve was recommending that it was 
efficient to borrow against rising equity in an inflationary market, even when cash flow 
was not sufficient to service the debt. Remember that during the 1940s, when the parity 
was at 110 percent, the farm debt was paid down to its lowest level since the USDA 
began keeping records on it. This becomes important when the desired goal is a 
restructuring by forcing resources out of the sector, as stated by both the C.E.D. and the 
Young Executive Committee of the USDA This is merely an observation of how the 
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permanent legislation was designed to work and how it did not work when it was 
overridden by farm bills based on a different set of assumptions. 
A look at some of the headlines in the Des Moines Register during the 1970s 
show that income was very much on the minds of people: "Iowa Farmers fear price ruin" 
(5-19-74), "Food middlemen boost margin while farmers struggle" (5-24-74), "Sharp 
drop in farm income" (6-12-74), and "USDA sees big jump in farm debts" (12-8-74). 
"Prices Farmers Pay Increase at Higher Rate than Profits" (1-1-76), and "Farm Share of 
Food Dollar Now Smaller than Labor's" (8-6-78). USDA Secretary Bergland caused a 
furor in 1978: "Bergland Says Changes due in Farm Policy (8-19-78) and "Bergland's 
$1. 50 Com Stirs Furor" (9-1-78). "NFU Sees Threat to Parity Idea" (2-18-79 ), "Bergland 
Tells Need of Farm Policy Changes" (8-29-79), "Sharpest Dip in Two Years for Farm 
Prices" (9-1-79), and "PCA Farm Loan Demand Zooms" (7-26-79). (PCA stand for the 
Production Credit Association. It is a branch of the Farm Credit System that loans money 
for operating expenses. Farmers tend to borrow to make up for annual financial losses.) 
These headlines were followed by: "Reagan Aide Sees Farm Subsidy Cuts" (1-22-81), 
"Reagan Backs Ending Farm Price Supports"' (10-18-81), and "Cut Farm Bill or See It 
Vetoed, Reagan Warns" (11-5-81). After Reagan's warning to Congress in November of 
1981, the following headline appeared in the Des Moines Register: "Farm Bureau 
Opposes Federal Price Supports"' (1-15-82). By the end of 1980s, the Farm Bureau was 
saying: "Farm Bureau Calls for Lower Loan, Target Levels"' (12-2-82). In the 1980s, 
many of the headlines included comments on the various farm bills ( which were cutting 
price supports). Richard Lyng (first chairman of the Young Executive Committee that 
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authored the 1971 Young Executive Report) is quoted in some articles of this time period 
defending the farm bills and saying that farm subsidies need to be cut in order to help 
farming (3-15-86 and 1-9-87). Notice that the man who had chaired the 1971 Young 
Executive Committee was the USDA secretary at the time of the 1980s farm restructuring 
when the media blitz to justify it occurred: "Prices Paid Farmers Hit 7-Year Low" (8-31-
85). In addition to this, the president oflowa State University, Gordon Eaton, went on 
public record in 1988 declaring: "Farming is a business, folks. It is not a hobby. It is not 
a way of life. It is a business, and what we have seen over the last seven or eight years as 
farms have been lost is ... what is best referred to as an industry shakeout." (4-5-88). This 
was during the farm restructuring of the 1980s! Here was the president of a land grant 
institution in a largely farming state echoing what the C.E.D. reports and the Young 
Executive Report of the USDA had been saying about underlying assumptions. 
The changes made by the Farm Credit Act of 1971 were significant. It is 
important that they were made in the same year that the USDA Young Executive 
Committee chose to support the policy recommendations of the C.E.D. The combined 
actions certainly removed significant resources from farming, as the policy 
recommendations called for. And the farmers who experienced the resulting financial 
difficulty were labeled as causing their own problems by being inefficient and greedy 
(buying high-priced land and equipment). The head of a land grant institution insisted 
that farming was not a way of life; it was a business; it was a business that was 
experiencing a "shakeout". If agriculture was going to be restructured, as called for in 
the reports previously discussed, then decisions had to be made about the only national 
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farm lender created for the purpose of making loans to agriculture - other than the 
USDA's Fm.HA Business planning would require this. 
The Dye elitist modeler begins by identifying the initial resources for researc~ 
study, planning, organization, and implementation of national policy-making as derived 
from corporate and personal wealth. The wealth is channeled into foundations, 
universities, and policy-making institutions. Corporate representatives and top wealth-
holders sit on the governing boards of these institutions. This model describes the plans 
for restructuring agriculture and the individuals who were in control as it was carried out. 
The foundations provide the initial "seed money" to analyze social 
problems, to determine national priorities, and to investigate new policy 
directions. Universities and intellectuals respond to the research emphases 
determined by the foundations and produce studies that conform to these 
predetermined emphases. (Dye, Who 's Running America, 216) 
Three of the influential policy-making groups are: the Council on Foreign Relations, the 
Committee on Economic Development (C.E.D.), and the Brookings Institute. According 
to the "Young Executive Report," the Brookings Institute was one of the sources of 
information for their Committee. (House Congressional Record, "Young Executive 
Report," 1971, 2173 8) According to Dye, the important function of these groups is 
consensus-building among elites. They bring together individuals at the top of corporate 
and financial institutions, universities, and foundations, as well as the top law firms and 
leading intellectuals, the mass media, and influential government figures. 
The goal of these activities is to develop action recommendations. These goals 
are then communicated to the policy-makers directly and through the mass media. The 
federal executive agencies (including the USDA and the FCA) go to work to fill in the 
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details; eventually, legislative proposals are prepared These proposals are circulated to 
the White House and congressional committees. The pluralist action from this point -
used as models for how legislation becomes law - occurs after the agenda for policy-
making has already been established. This is the reason for the disagreement between the 
elitist modelers and the pluralist modelers such as Dahl, Arnold, Hanse~ and Browne. 
The pluralist modelers do not look at how opinions are shaped because they consider it 
too nebulous; neither do pluralist modelers look at control of resources because they 
consider it unquantifiable. Pluralists begin with Congress and look to see who is 
lobbying them. Both elitist models and pluralist models should arrive at the same place; 
the difference is the starting point. 
By the time the Young Executive Committee was formed in 1971 and given the 
instructions to study the farm income problem, the C.E.D. had been making its 
recommendations for a change on national agriculture policy since 1944. Notice that the 
1969 Commission looking into changes to the Farm Credit System had the requisite 
membership of the Zaller and Dye elitist models to form a consensus of a new policy 
goal. That the resulting legislation was implemented the same year as the "Young 
Executive Report" is also significant. The first major overhaul of a system created to 
loan money to the farm sector needed to be in a position to handle the increased amounts 
of capital required for the planned industrialized and commercialized agriculture sector. 
The pluralist models for congressional action of Arnold, Hansen, and Browne overlook 
this crucial process that took place prior to their focus on congressional action. 
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Notes 
1 Hoth Butz and-Hardin were appointees at different times in the Nixon Administration. 
2 This information comes from a USDA website http://www.reeusda.gov/ecs/rrdc.htm. 
3 ~--umentation fot this can also be found in the annual reports of the system. beginning with the 1969 
report. These can be obtained through the Farm Credit Administration in McLean, Virginia. 
4 The Farm Credit System gets its money from the securities market. A specific list of brokers (induding 
Federal Reserve Banks) purchase the 18 issues a year, keep what they want, and sell off some to others. 
This puts the financial elites in control of money going into the system. 
5 Atkinson, Sue, "The farm crisis of the 1980s in Iowa: Its roots and its inner workings," an MA thesis at 
Iowa State University 1999. 
6 As an employee of the Farm Credit System at this time, it was my job to know this. The information is 
also supported by Federal Reserve Economist Marvin Duncan in articles he wrote for the Kansas City 
Federal Reserve in ihe 1980s. When the Farm Credii Administration was restructured during ihe 1980s, 
Marvin Duncan became one of the three new board members. For a while, he held the position of chairman 
of the Farm Credit board. 
7 My area of specialty at the Farm Credit System during this time was accounting and financial. The 
annual financial reports show that this was happening, when you know how to read the accounting. 
8 It was my job to write the financial reports and to be familiar with the accounting changes as well as the 
changes in the loan analysis forms. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
AGRICULTURAL STATISTICS 1949 TO 1999 
The years selected for this study were 1949 to 1999. The reason for this choice is 
because in 1949 the U.S. had come through the Great Depression and the war years and 
was operating on a food policy that paid, on average, 90% of parity to producers of 
enumerated commodities. As the legislation itself explains (in Title 7 U.S. Code 
Annotated), the rationale behind this policy was to put farmers and rural areas on a more 
equal footing in buying power with other sectors of the economy in order to improve 
their quality of life. To accomplish this, a safety net was provided for production used 
domestically, that also influenced the price of value-added products. 
An explanation from the combined elitist models being used for this paper as to 
why this policy was implemented would say that the Great Depression affected a 
sufficient percentage of citizens across sectors to result in widespread unrest. The result 
was enough instability to raise concern within the group of identified elites. Those within 
the group of elites who favored more of a welfare approach were able to convince those 
who favored a more free market approach to change the underlying policy assumptions in 
order to regain stability. Pluralists would say there was an increase in the lobbying of 
Congress for welfare legislation. The outcome was the same. For agriculture, support 
for rural areas ( which included businesses and banking in those areas) was accomplished 
by providing a minimum average price to producers of enumerated commodities that 
would cover the average costs of production and provide a living wage to the producers. 
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This policy not only provided buying power, but also allowed for the payment of local 
taxes that fund services and infrastructure. 
While Congress annually tinkered with various details of the permanent farm 
legislatio~ the ground work for formal challenges to this policy were initiated in 1942 
with the formation of the Committee for Economic Development (C.E.D.), businessme~ 
not consumers. The first C.E.D. policy paper on agricultural policy, issued in 1944, 
recommended an abandonment of the assumptions underlying the permanent farm 
legislation in favor of what they considered a business approach. The businessmen 
wanted to use free trade to maximize the potential return on resources by allowing capital 
to roam the world looking for the lowest input prices ( which would include farm 
commodities) unencumbered by domestic policies that supported domestic prices. 
Subsequent farm policy position papers followed from them in 1956, 1957, and 1962, 
continuing to push for a change in policy in order to force resources out of agriculture 
and into other sectors of the economy- as stated in the papers themselves - for the 
purpose of maximizing returns on resources. 
In 1971, the USDA produced a report (called the "Young Executive Report") that 
signaled a willingness by the Executive Branch to begin pursuing the course of action 
being recommended by the C.E.D. since 1944. The public had not been clamoring for an 
elimination of subsidies up to that time. This is illustrated by a disclaimer that was added 
to the final report when it was released in 1972 - an election year - saying that the 
members of the committee felt their opinion might not be a majority one but that more 
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people needed to accept this conclusion. Also enacted in 1971 was the first major 
overhaul of the Farm Credit System, an agricultural lender since 1933. 
The farm bills after this time were written on a different set of assumptions, goals, 
action plans, and indicators that focused on maximizing the return on resources rather 
than supporting farm income for production used domestically. These farm bills 
overrode the permanent farm legislation on the books that had guaranteed a minimum 
income to the farm sector, and lowered the prices of enumerated commodities to the 
producers- as called for by the C.E.D. policy papers and the "Young Executive Report". 
These new farm bills were designed to move the farm sector away from what members of 
the C.E.D. called a focus on welfare (income maintenance for farmers) toward free 
markets (a focus on business return to assets). In 1993, NAFTA was approved, followed 
by the WTO of GATT. When you read the preambles to these agreements, it is obvious 
that the expectation of the underlying assumptions is for the increased return to resources 
to improve the circumstances of people around the world. By 1996, the Freedom to Farm 
bill was approved, repealing (rather than just overriding) several sections of the 
permanent farm legislation, following the guidelines of NAFT A and GATT. 
It is interesting to note that other signatory countries have been slower to change 
their domestic policies to accommodate the terms of these agreements ( contrary to the 
urgings of the U.S. to follow suit), and at this writing it appears that even the U.S. is 
considering 2002 farm legislation that steps back from forcing this transition as quickly 
as it was being pursued. According to the combined elitist models being used in this 
paper, an explanation for this might appear to be that the resulting instability is not 
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desirable. In the Dye elitist model, his findings indicate that his group of identified elites 
attempt to maintain support for a national "ethos" by separating economic outcomes from 
political activity by doing two things: maintaining aggregate growth of the economy so 
the resulting trickle-down increase benefits the masses; and maintaining the belief in 
opportunity for upward social mobility. (Dye, Top down Policymaking, 2000, 33) Dye' s 
model might conclude that if reality differed sufficiently from perception, then the time 
frame should be slowed. The perceptions, of course, are maintained through the public 
education system and the mass media. Based on his assumptions, if the stock market had 
maintained its growth, if there had not been large numbers of job layoffs where sufficient 
numbers were unable to quickly find other employment, the perception that only the farm 
sector was experiencing problems ( due to its own perceived inefficiency) might have 
been maintained; when sufficient numbers in other sectors are experiencing similar 
problems, the perception becomes more difficult to maintain. Pluralists would look for 
shifts in the lobbying of Congress without assigning explanations. 
The income maintenance policy would have justified support for farm income by 
using increased per-unit-yield (not just increased production) to provide any lowering of 
prices to consumers, and used education curriculums and the mass media to promote 
acceptance for the idea that all sectors were benefiting from income support. The free 
market utilitarian policy would eliminate income support ( allowing domestic prices to 
sink to world-level prices), citing increased production as the cause of lower prices to 
farmers ( without explaining the food shortages and problems with feeding masses of 
starving people), and justified itself by focusing on how world competition was providing 
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a better financial deal to consumers ( s shift of focus). Both of these models would show 
increased production of commodities on a per-unit basis. One model would use this 
increased production efficiency to show that consumers are paying for efficient 
production while the amounts over domestic market needs are used to feed those both 
domestically and internationally who cannot afford to be in the market - a humanitarian 
act of charity. The other model would use the increased production to say that supporting 
resources engaged in this increased production was inefficient and was costing the 
consumers unnecessary expenditures instead of allowing their money to earn a better 
return elsewhere; those who are not able to be in the market are just not taking advantage 
of the opportunity being offered to them by the free market. These reflect differences in 
underlying assumptions, thus differences in explanations of outcomes. 
Six commodities were initially examined for focus: wheat, com, soybeans, beef, 
pork, and dairy. Of these, four (wheat, com, soybeans, and dairy) were enumerated 
commodities. In other words, there was a minimum support price that varied over time 
due to the permanent farm legislation. Beef and pork were also included because (along 
with poultry) they would be affected by this transition through their use of com and 
soybean meal for feed. Early in this 50-year time frame, the poultry industry was 
completely vertically and horizontally integrated and industrialized - the model desired 
by the C.E.D. and the USDA "Young Executive Report". For this reason, the data in the 
USDA Statistical Yearbooks would not be meaningful for this project. 
We already know that new technologies can increase the output per individual and 
per unit of production, so an examination of the increasing farm size and dwindling farm 
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numbers was not done. While it would be interesting to examine the increase in 
confinement operations - because they indicate the degree of industrialization and 
commercialization of livestock production - data on this was not collected by the USDA 
until the 1990s, making comparisons unhelpful for this paper. Coming with the increase 
in confinement operations is the increase in contracted production. This change 
restructures the control of assets employed in agricultural production. An opportunity for 
future research in this area would be tracking the consolidation of control of farm 
resources to flesh out the Dye model. Contracted production has been slower to take over 
in crops, but it is picking up speed with the steadily lower commodity prices of the last 
ten years. Under a contract, the farmer becomes the hired help. If a crop farmer does not 
have the equipment for part, or all, of the job, the company offering the contract will take 
care of it. What the farmer does have to supply, interestingly enough, is on-farm storage. 
This requirement is similar in nature to the requirement of livestock contractors to build 
facilities to certain specifications in order to contract at all. Neither group owns the 
product of their labor. 
The requirement for some sort of an investment partially disperses the cost of 
assets from the company offering the contract, and it makes it more difficult for the 
farmer to back out of the contract. In other words, it is leverage. Debt requires payments. 
Lenders push for contracts because of more reliable payments. Of course, supported 
minimum commodity prices used to do the same thing. Because the number of 
companies involved in buying livestock and grains is decreasing ( through buyouts and 
consolidation - called "efficiencies''), the interconnectedness of the horizontal and 
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vertical integration is increasing. While the livestock sector (the value-added for the 
grains) was taken over fi~ the grain sector is following rapidly. 
Since grains have been enumerated commodities - covered by the permanent 
farm legislation - whose cost is a basic expense for livestock feeding, we will look at 
what has happened to them first. Figures 2, 3, and 4 show the increase in production per 
acre used in production during the fifty-year time frame of this paper. As expected, 
minimal changes in acres under cultivation reveal increases in yield per acre. 
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Figure 2: Bushels of wheat produced per acre planted 
Source: USDA Annual Siatistics Books 1949-1999. 
As anyone familiar with farmers can tell yo~ when the price goes down the 
frequent response is not to cut back on production but to either try to produce more to 
make up for the lower price, or switch to another crop that looks like it will pay better. 
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Figure 3: Bushels of soybeans produced per acre planted. 
Source: USDA Annual Statistical Yearbooks 1949-1999. 
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Figure 4: Bushels of corn produced per acre planted 
Source: USDA Annual Statistics Yearbooks 1949-1999. 
114 
While the argument is used that farmers were producing more in order to get the 
government price supports, the lower prices do not always bear this out. An argument 
could be made that farmers were trying to generate sufficient income to pay on their 
debts. 
Figures 5, 6, and 7 show that not only did the commodity prices go down (as the 
C.E.D. and USDA called for in their reports), but they continued to go down during the 
farm restructuring of the 1980s, when expenses to farmers were rising. The proposed 
C.E.D. and USDA policy was to force down the prices to farmers in order to force large 
nwnbers of them out of farming and allow a handful-who were willing to be 
industrialized and commercialized - to produce for the domestic needs and export the 
surplus. The permanent farm legislation would have covered inflation and other 
expenses, such as interest, that were devastating in the 1980s, preventing many of the 
liquidations that took place, because farmers would have been able to pay on their debts. 
A price deflator analysis would not show the results that follow; the line would be more 
or less straight. The permanent farm legislation would have maintained the income to 
farmers and to rural areas, contrary to the wishes of the elites (indicated by the C.E.D. 
and USDA reports) to restructure agriculture and force some resources into other sectors. 
The USDA call to reduce supports to disaster levels did exactly that. The prices paid to 
commodity producers went down by about half. The results was an inability to service 
debts. Even the permanent farm legislation would only have supported average debt 
load. Those with more debt would still _have been liquidated. 
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Figure 5: Price-deflated wheat prices 1949-1997. 
Source: USDA Annual Statistical Yearbooks. 
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Figure 6: Price-deflated soybean prices 1949-1997. 
Source: USDA Annual Statistical Yearbooks. 
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During this time, the necessary investment for technology was increasing. This 
investment would have been covered under the permanent farm legislation, but was not 
covered when the support prices were reduced to disaster levels. In addition to the cost 
of investment, the price of the debt load was crucial to farming operations. The 
permanent legislation covered the average cost of interest; the disaster level prices did 
not. The USDA was surely aware of this when they made their recommendation to 
reduce support prices to disaster levels. This is what makes the contracting arrangements 
of interest. Once a farmer has agreed to produce something on contract, his rate of 
interest is lowered, making contracting the more desired form of production. 
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Figure 7: Price-deflated corn prices 1949-1997. 
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Since com and soybeans are used for livestock feed, data for cattle and hogs was 
also collected. This collection process showed a large increase in imported live cattle and 
hogs, as well as pork and beef after the early 1970s. Given the change in underlying 
policy assumptions from supporting domestic production in order to support income, to 
maximizing return on resources, increased imports from countries with lower standards 
of living as a component of their price would be expected. 
USDA also reports farm income in the aggregate, not by a breakdown as to 
source. This masks to the general public, when it is reported at all, the extent to which 
farm income, through market price, is failing to cover farm expenses. What the public 
sees is a farm income whose median looks roughly comparable to everyone elses. That 
creates dissention as to the purpose of the subsidies. Just as minimum wage does not 
support a family at anything above the poverty level, neither does disaster level support 
prices support a farming operation above the level of poverty. Arguments for and against 
supporting income stem from the differing underlying assumptions between those on 
each side of the debate. Explanations for the data will differ, based on the underlying 
assumptions and the goal. 
The C.E.D. reports clearly show a desire on the part of the business sector to 
change the underlying assumptions of agriculture policy-making. These people are not 
lobbied by the public, and do not depend on public voting for their position. The "Young 
Executive Report' ' of the USDA clearly reflects a similar desire to change underlying 
assumptions for agriculture policy. This report was written by career bureaucrats who are 
not elected to office. This supports the elitist model for policy formation. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
CONCLUSION 
The desired agricultural policy outcome, recommended by the C.E.D. since 1944, 
is still in the process of occurring. The restructuring is quite far along, but it has not yet 
reached the complete industrialization and commercialization desired. The qualifier to 
this statement is that the majority of production is being carried out by the small number 
of industrialized, commercialized, operations as envisioned by the C.E.D. and USDA 
reports. Given the diminishing resistance to the change, and the financial destabilization 
of the remaining independent producers, it should be completed soon. Poultry has been 
completely vertically and horizontally integrated (industrialized and commercialized) for 
most of the past fifty years. Hogs are very far along in this process. As the number of 
hogs being contracted in large confinement facilities increases, along with imported meat, 
the market disappears for the remaining independents. This action, coupled with the 
currently increased contracted price, reduces the market price to independent producers, 
financially destabilizing them and forcing them out of business. Cattle are also far along 
in the process of vertical and horizontal integration. The animals in these facilities 
receive acknowledged priority at the processing plants, thus satisfying the domestic 
market and reducing the demand for the animals raised by independent producers who 
are not raising livestock for a contracted price. Add to this the amount of beef and pork 
also being imported into the U.S., therefore a part of the volume available in the market 
place, and it becomes possible to manipulate statistics to say that there are too many U.S. 
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livestock producers producing too much meat and some of them have got to be put out of 
business. 
As the USDA statistics show, the portion of the consumer dollar going to the 
independent livestock producers has been dropping steadily the past fifty years. Notice 
that the drop is around fifty percent. In addition to this drop in the share of the consumer 
dollar, there has also been a drop in the real dollar price received by those producers 
selling livestock into the market place - in other words, those not on a contracted price. 
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Figure 8: Farmer percent of consumer dollar 
Source: USDA Annual Statistical Yearbook. 
' Pluralists and elitists have differing explanations for why these agricultural policy 
changes took place. Pluralists would explain the changes as shifts in the power of various 
groups lobbying Congress. Their focus is on Congress because of their assumption that 
policymaking takes place there by virtue of the fact that votes are cast on legislation. 
Elitists would explain the policy changes as beginning with activities that take place prior 
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to the visible world of congressional actions. Their focus lies with influence through 
control of curriculum content, media, and other resources. According to elitist models, it 
is this subtle influence over time that results in the changes in lobbying groups. 
The elitist work of Zaller and Dye is interesting in that it notes a split in their 
identified group of elites, denoted by the ideological differences I have noted previously: 
the new wealth that has embraced the Adam Smith approach to capitalism through 
individual self-interest versus the old wealth that believes there are social responsibilities 
to ameliorate the consequences of pursuit of wealth. While Dye maintains that both of 
these groups want the same ends and differ only in the means to these ends, I believe the 
ideological differences cannot be downplayed this much because they are too crucial to 
explanatory influences. Further examination of these ideological differences might 
provide a better explanation for why some countries are slow in meeting the terms of 
NAFTA and GATT while the U.S. proceeds to dismantle its protective policies. 
Dye also notes that the United States is the only country in the world most 
progressed in the pursuit of self-interest to the exclusion of societal responsibility. He is 
not the only one with this opinion - even the Pope has noted it. It is my opinion this 
came about as a result of the availability of capital in this country (mostly in the form of 
land initially) and the delayed Industrial Revolution, making for more individual 
opportunities than in other older parts of the world. When this is coupled with the lack of 
prior centuries of Church dominance ( such as in Europe) and the Protestant Reformation, 
the fracture in the U.S. elites becomes more understandable, and more important for 
further analysis. 
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Although there are always those who will try to use instability to play one faction 
off against another in order to maintain power ( a dicey situation at best), instability is not 
generally seen as desirable. Even Machiavelli discusses this in his advice to the Medicis 
in The Prince. According to the combined elitist models used in this paper, when there is 
to be a major departure from policy (which restructuring agriculture would be), an 
additional consensus-building step may be used to prepare the public. This would be 
accomplished by using those in the group of elites to talk and write increasingly about an 
issue, pointing toward some "pre-approved" solutions. Publications, the media, and 
school curriculums would reflect this activity. Think tanks and foundations will increase 
the spending for research and writing on particular topics, rewarding those who arrive at 
the politically-desired conclusion. Frequently Presidential Commissions become 
involved in this task. These commissions may also contract with universities for research 
or to hear testimony, even though the recommendations are known in advance. When 
Presidential Commissions are not used, a more fruitful path is for federal executive 
agencies to respond directly to the policy-planning group recommending the change. 
These executive agencies, similarly, contract with universities for supporting research, 
usually to verify that there is a problem that needs to be addressed. The "seed money" of 
the foundations and corporations for the research is then supplanted with massive 
infusions of government research contracts and grants. As a result of this, the 
government agencies - aware of the support of the top policy-planning groups - feel free 
to support research in the approved areas. (Dye, Who's Running America?, 1976, 195) 
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This appears to be the approach taken by the USDA when it formed the Young 
Executive Committee and asked them to study the farm income problem. The 
recommendation of the committee - very much in line with the prior policy position 
papers of the C.E.D. -focused on the difference in underlying assumptions between the 
permanent farm legislation and the mission of the USDA, as cited in previous chapters of 
this project. Based on this change in underlying assumptions, the committee dutifully 
concluded that the focus of farm legislation needed to be changed. Of note is that the 
committee took pains to point out in their report that their opinion was likely not a 
majority opinion. This clearly indicates that the public was not heavily lobbying in favor 
of a change in farm policy at the time the report was written. 
There was some opposition to the planned restructuring of agriculture from some 
farmers. The National Farmers Organization (NFO) found out about the 1962 C.E.D. 
policy paper and loudly objected to it. It did the same thing with the USDA "Young 
Executive Report," distributing copies. 1 This vocal opposition indicated it was necessary 
to lay more groundwork with the larger public before initiating the change in policy. 
Pluralists do acknowledge there was a shift in focus from farmers to consumers, but they 
need to do more research as to why this occurred in order to better support their 
conclusions that this shift alone accounts for the change in congressional lobbying. 
The timing of the formation of the Young Executive Committee in April of 1971 
is interesting. It came on the heels of the 1970 report issued by the 27-member 
Commission on Agricultural Credit. The Commission was formed in May of 1969 and 
issued "The Farm Credit System in the 70's-The Report of the Commission on 
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Agricultural Credif' ten months later. This was the first major overhaul of a system, 
created solely to finance farmers and ranchers, farmer cooperatives, and ag-related 
businesses, last changed in 1933 during the Great Depression. Congress was going to be 
considering significant proposed changes for agriculture in 1971. Logic is not strained 
here by saying that there needed to be some agreement on agricultural policy in 
significant sectors for this legislation to be enacted. Remember that servicing of loans is 
dependent on income. If there was going to be a shift away from supporting farm 
income, would the new policy enable the loans to be serviced, thus not leading to 
destabilization of lenders? The "experts" (part of the group of elites in our combined 
elitist model), who would be expected to testify at the hearings on the proposed 
legislation, would either lend credence to it or would "shoot it down." Zaller and Dye 
consider this groundwork crucial to a coming major policy change. At this time, there 
was not a heavy lobbying of Congress by the public for a change in underlying policy 
assumptions. 
In the closing comments of the USDA report, the Committee noted that farming 
was going to become highly mechanized and specialized, requiring large amounts of 
capital. "Even if farm numbers should drop to 600,000," this would not be detrimental to 
the U.S. because of the degree of mechanization and specialization. "If there had been 
only 600,000 farms in 1970, sales of the average farm would have been about $90,000." 
(USDA, "Young Executive Report/' H2 l 74 l) The Committee was clearly looking at the 
number of farms in the U.S. dropping from around six million in 1970 to 600,000, or less, 
and still being able to meet the domestic needs of the country due to industrialization and 
124 
commercialization. That reduction in 1970 would be around ninety percent, a significant 
number! In order for the remaining ten percent to survive and meet the domestic needs, 
they would need large amounts of capital to industrialize and commercialize, as well as 
sufficient income to service the larger debt-load. This is consistent with the logic of the 
C.E.D. and the USDA in their, and possibly accounts for the changes to the Farm Credit 
System.. Destabilization with the remaining economic sectors could be avoided if the 
groundwork was properly laid. 
The Arnold, Hansen, and Browne models of pluralistic consensus do not consider 
the significance of the C.E.D. reports nor the USDA committee, why they were 
organized, or why they made the recommendations they did at the time they did ( without 
the public clamoring for such a change). Since these groups were not composed of 
elected officials they could not have been responding to pluralistic concerns. Calling 
these actions coincidental or insignificant is too simplistic. Pluralists need to prove their 
point. The pluralist modelers should also explain the policy statements of the C.E.D., 
that their policy position papers were for use in school curriculums and the news media. 
Was there a corresponding change in school curriculums and media reporting? If not, 
this would be a rebuttal to those elitist models who are using such an argument. If there 
was, then the pluralist modelers should come to their own conclusions as to why this was 
happening, and consider if this possibly influenced the changes in congressional lobbying 
or the position of members of Congress. 
According to the combined elitist models used in this paper, once the mindset of 
enough people had been headed in the direction that free markets were the future of 
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farming, allowing the permanent legislation to resume was not a viable option. The 1990 
farm bill, for example, actually expired on December 31, 1995, at midnight, according to 
Title 7. Legally, the permanent legislation should have been in effect. USDA Secretary 
Dan Glickman made sufficient excuses that Congress had until May to pass legislation 
( unsupported by the language of Title 7). Congress was finally able to come up with the 
votes to enact Freedom to Farm - the final step envisioned by the C.E.D. policy 
recommendations. Since most of the public was unaware of the language of Title 7, and 
the news media did not inform them, the deception worked. 2 Pluralist modelers should 
provide an explanation for this in their work to have an alternative account. 
The combined elitist model used here assumes that the initial resources for 
research, study, planning, and formulation of national policy are derived from corporate 
and personal wealth. For this reason, Dye begins his work by citing the concentration of 
wealth with specific individuals, thus indicating potential influence for the individuals 
who control this wealth. One of the ways this wealth is used is by channeling it into 
foundations, universities, and policy-planning groups in the form of endowments, grants, 
and contracts. In addition to this, corporate presidents, directors, and top wealth-holders 
also sit on the governing boards of the foundations, universities, and policy-planning 
groups to oversee the spending of the funds. So, this vast wealth provides the financial 
resources and the overall direction of policy research, planning and development. 
The key, essential, linkages to the process are the foundations between wealth and 
the intellectual community. It is the foundations that determine broad policy objectives. 
They provide the "seed monef' to analyze various identified problems, determine 
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national priorities, and investigate new policy directions. At a later time, when the 
government has been brought in, government funding is used for the more massive 
research projects. This is controlled by requesting suggestions for grants, and then 
approving those that meet the desired new policy suggestions. Corresponding prizes for 
appropriate conclusions also contributes to the desired direction. Pluralists do not look 
at this type of work taking place prior to groups lobbying Congress on policy issues, but 
they need to in order to provide their own alternative explanations for it. 
At the same time that the foundations are directing and funding major university 
research, they are also contributing to the support of policy planning groups. These 
policy planning groups may also be supported by corporations and wealthy individuals. 
Such groups are central coordinating points in the entire elite policy-making process. 
They do their work by bringing together people at the top of the corporate and financial 
institutions, the universities, the foundations, the mass media, the powerful law firms, the 
top intellectuals, and influential figures in government. This collection reviews the 
pertinent university and foundation research on selected topics and tries to reach a 
consensus about what action should be taken. Their goal is to develop action 
recommendations that are explicit policies or programs designed to resolve or soften 
national problems. The C.E.D., the Council on Foreign Relations (C.F.R.), and the 
Brookings Institute are think tanks that submit their reports to the foundations and policy-
making groups for further discussion prior to beginning efforts at policy implementation. 
Although the C.E.D. is now not as powerful as it once was, the C.F.R. appears to have 
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picked up the slack. It was the C.F.R. that worked for the implementation ofNAFTA and 
GA TT (WTO), according to Dye. (Dye, Top Down, 2000, 27) 
As a rule, corporate representatives sit on boards of trustees of the foundations, 
universities, and policy-planning groups. Wealthy individuals also serve in these same 
capacities. The personnel interlocking corporation boards, university trustees, foundation 
boards, and policy-planning boards is extensive. It is not uncommon for an individual to 
sit on the C.E.D. as well as on boards at other levels in the process. Dye tracks who is 
holding these positions and publishes the information on a regular basis. Once the policy 
planning groups are done with their work, the policy recommendations are then 
distributed to the mass media, federal executive agencies, and the Congress - as indicated 
by the language in the first C.E.D. reports cited in Chapter One. The mass media are 
crucial in preparing public opinion for the policy change. These same "movers and 
shakers" also try to encourage political personalities to change their positions on issues 
when that is necessary by using the influence they have through their control of 
resources. 
The combined elitist models used in this paper provide one alternative elitist 
explanation, in addition to several pluralist models, for how the permanent farm 
legislation came to be almost completely repealed by the time of the 1996 Freedom to 
Farm legislation. According to the combined elitist model used here, the C.E.D. was the 
think tank that decided the underlying assumptions of the U. S. farm policy had to be 
changed away from those of the permanent legislation. The change was going to be so 
drastic that it could not be implemented right away. Copies of the report - according to 
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the report itself - were circulated to the executive department agencies, universities, and 
business communities to incubate. The recommendations were again issued in 1956, 
1957, and 1962. When sufficient ground-work had been laid, test legislation was enacted 
in 1965 to show that Congress could enact new farm legislation that overrode the 
permanent legislation, and no instability occurred. 
Nineteen seventy-one became the pivotal year. The executive agency of the 
USDA organized its Young Executive Committee, composed of the department heads 
who play a minor, but important, role in the power structure. They carried out their 
mission of appearing to examine the problem of farm income and arriving at some 
recommendations (which correlated to the recommendations of the C.E.D.). Also in 
1971, legislation was passed to completely upgrade the Farm Credit System, changing the 
terms of its lending to farmer/borrowers. With credit covered, income could be 
addressed. With the policy change more recognizable now, Congress could move ahead 
with its incremental approach to phasing out the permanent farm legislation. 
This paper has presented one elitist account of how the restructuring of agriculture 
occurred, and is presented to incorporate more pieces of the puzzle than are currently 
used by the various pluralist models. Pluralists should do more work to provide their 
own alternative explanations for the incorporation of this additional information. Tests of 
the accuracy will depend on more work. Of significance is the inclusion of greater 
discussion of differing ideologies and the influence this has on policy positions. 
The underlying assumptions of capitalism, as we know it in this country through 
our school curriculums and media, actually stem from the influence of some Protestant 
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ideas moving into secular ideas as capitalism was in its beginning stages. These were all 
transplanted to Ameri~ where there was an absence of prior centuries of a prevailing 
counter-culture with a different set of underlying assumptions - except for the Indians 
who were brushed aside by the colonists as undeveloped and inconsequential. There is a 
tendency to forget that not all cultures embrace comparable ideologies and histories of 
influence. When pluralist modelers make certain market assumptions about how 
influence works, they seem to forget these assumptions come with embedded ideological 
roots. The combined elitist models used in this paper attempt to take this into account. 
Pluralist modelers should similarly do this for their own explanations. 
Areas of further research should include a look at public school curriculum and 
media content during this fifty-year time frame. Just as Zaller did with his examination 
of Vietnam War coverage, the media coverage of farm policy needs to be researched, 
documented, and explanations provided by various categories of modelers. In addition to 
these areas, Dye's work on identifying specific individuals in positions of influence needs 
to be expanded to covert 940 to 1970. 3 If it is possible to document grant and fellowship 
funding on this topic for this time period, that should be done in order to either prove or 
disprove the combined elitist model used here - or to allow pluralist modelers to provide 
their alternative explanations. Plenty of work is ahead. 
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Notes 
1 In the Appendix to this paper is a copy of the cover used by the NFO when it distributed copies of the 
"Young Executive Report." 
2 I happened to be doing research at the time on Title 7 and looked this up to verify it. While the farm 
r.oup,s were infoI?1ed ?fthis, money f~r a law~it ~as n~t available. . . 
· Dyes work begms with 1970. If the tnformat10n IS available to begin wtth 1940 and come up to that 
time, it should be possible to better track what happened after the initial 1944 C.E.D. report. 
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Table 1: Beef data 1949-1997. 
BEEF HEAD Is #sOF Is HEAD 
YEAR SLAUGHTERED PROCESSED DOMESTIC USE STOCKS IMPORTED 
1949 30134000 1onooooooo 9,420,000,000 152,398,000 762000 
1950 290TTOOO 10764000000 9,5i7,000,000 120,736,000 
1951 26013000 9896000000 8,462,000,000 231,914,000 
1952 28076000 10819000000 9,518,000,000 231,914,000 
1953 36783000 13953000000 13,634,000,000 231,914,000 
1954 39278000 14541000000 14,365,000,000 231,914,000 
1955 39451000 15147000000 14,837,000,000 231,914,000 
1956 40751000 16094000000 15,686,000,000 224,391,000 
1957 38594000 15728000000 15,734,000,000 250,533,000 
1958 33307000 14516000000 14,951,000,000 146,840,000 
1959 31795000 14588000000 15, 192,000,000 206,639,000 
1960 34632000 15835000000 16,212,000,000 212,069,000 1331300 
1961 34548000 16342000000 16,893,000,000 199,207,000 1476300 
1962 34759000 16311000000 17,306,000,000 211,376,000 1649800 
1963 35262000 17350000000 18,478,000,000 199,708,000 1612300 
1964 39291000 19435000000 19,972,000,000 287,583,000 1550300 
1965 40959000 19719000000 20,024,000,000 242,578,000 1746400 
1966 41030000 20604000000 20,989,000,000 269,214,000 1853100 
1967 40402000 20976000000 21,472,000,000 247,756,000 1843000 
i968 410-24000 2i5TTOOOOOO 22,330,000,000 274,675,000 1932i00 
1969 40584000 21799000000 22,719,000,000 296,497,000 1989300 
1970 39558000 22239000000 23.506,000,000 352,895,000 1986100 
1971 39716000 22414000000 23,629,000,000 338,365,000 2106600 
1972 39254000 22839000000 24,420,000,000 365,972,000 2475200 
1973 36403000 21634000000 23,166,000,000 367,117,000 2440000 
1974 41039000 23624000000 24,982,000,000 447,792,000 1815300 
1975 46870000 24847000000 26,274,000,000 407,132,000 1995600 
1976 48724000 26822000000 28,287,000,000 351,340,000 2108900 
1977 48073000 26113000000 27,874,000,000 474,572,000 2324100 r 978 44272000 24874000000 25,645,000,000 314,021 ,000 1979 36932000 21880000000 23,968,000,000 423,712,000 
1980 36795000 22044000000 23,733,000,000 367,305,000 
11
981 38151000 22825000000 24,194,000,000 361,332,000 
1982 39264000 22984000000 24,455,000,000 249,067,000 
1983 40136000 23695000000 25,286,000,000 303,214,000 
1984 41269000 24223000000 25,507,000,000 383,014,000 
1985 40048000 24242000000 26,005,000,000 375,138,000 
1986 41046000 24895000000 26,485,000,000 318,438,000 
1987 38792000 23995000000 25,707,000,000 320,608,000 
1988 37889000 23985000000 25,663 ,000,000 316 ,693,000 22239000 
1989 36329000 23443000000 24,686,000,000 315,137,000 2185800 
1990 35277000 23070000000 24,355,000,000 259,844,000 2317400 
1991 34368000 23223000000 24,4 i 8,000,000 298,890,000 2252200-
1992 34489000 23526000000 24,571,000,000 329,094,000 2249200 
1993 34746000 23335000000 24.292.000.000 286,376,000 2292000 
1994 35691000 24679000000 25,416,000,000 430,239,000 2223700 
1995 37294000 25542000000 25,852,000,000 420,323,000 2314900 
1996 38575000 25906000000 26,241,000,000 367,890,000 2192400 
1997 38111000 25823000000 25,942,000,000 290,297,000 2384900 
Source: Data collected from USDA Annual Statistical Yearbooks. 
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Table 2: Beef data (part 2) 1949-1997. 
Is Is AVE. PRICE PRICE AVE. PRICE ADJ. IMPORTS 
IMPORTED EXPORTED /CWT INDEX FOR INFLATION AS%EXP 
254,000,000 19,207,000 $ 19.19 1.00 $ 19.19 1322°/4 
348,000,000 16,519,000 $ 23.10 1.01 $ 22.66 2107% 
484,000,000 11 ,607,000 $ 28.70 1.09 $ 26.39 4170°1< 
429,000,000 14,734,000 $ 24.30 1.11 $ 21.85 2912% 
271,000,000 38,731,000 $ 16.30 1.12 $ 14.52 700% 
226,000,000 33,824,000 $ 16.00 1.13 $ 14.21 668% 
118,514,000 40,664,000 $ 15.60 1.12 $ 13.89 291% 
111,860,000 81,087,000 $ 14.90 1.14 $ 13.07 138% 
232,484,000 88,536,000 $ 1720 1.18 $ 14.59 263% 
397,857,000 24,772,000 $ 21.90 121 $ 18.04 1606% 
626,249,000 27,358,000 $ 22.60 1.22 $ 18.51 2289o/c 
491,296,000 29,390,000 $ 20.40 1.24 $ 16.42 1672% 
665,271,000 29,906,000 $ 20.20 1.26 $ 16.08 2225% 
947,819,000 27,113,000 $ 21 .30 1.27 $ 16.77 3496% 
1, 122,-419,000 27,319,000 $ 19.90 128 $ 15.50 4109% 
800,401,000 57,245,000 $ 18.00 1.30 $ 13.83 1398% 
699,952,000 43,792,000 $ 19.90 1.32 $ 15.04 1598°/, 
893,273,000 28,833,000 $ 20.20 1.36 $ 14.84 3098o/c 
979,012,000 31,272,000 $ 22.30 1.40 $ 15.93 3131o/c 
1,128,040,000 27,030,000 $ 23.40 i.46 $ i6.03 4;73v1i 
1,216,603,000 25,700,000 $ 26.20 1.54 $ 17.05 4734°1< 
1,350,392,000 29,271 ,000 s 27.10 1.63 $ 16.65 4613% 
1,310,653,000 42,042,000 $ 29.00 1.70 $ 17.08 3117% 
1,480,853,000 52,156,000 $ 33.50 1.75 $ 19.10 2839% 
i ,496,706,000 79,122,000 $ 42.60 i.66 $ 22.97 1692% 
1,217,851,000 50,596,000 $ 35.60 2.07 $ 17.20 2407% 
1,314,721,000 45,620,000 $ 32.30 2.26 $ 14.32 2882% 
1,486,149,000 80,588,000 $ 33.70 2.39 $ 14.12 184-4% 
1,267,272,000 82,998,000 $ 34.40 2.54 $ 13.52 1527% 
1,501 ,765,000 110,042,000 48.50 2.74 $ 17.72 1355% ... 
1,575,930,000 114,806,000 $ 66.00 3.05 $ 21 .67 1373% 
1,405,592,000 119,006,000 $ 62.40 3.46 $ 18.05 1181% 
1,205,690,000 149,338,000 $ 58.60 3.81 $ 15.36 807% 
1,324,666,000 171,334,000 $ 56.70 4.05 $ 14.00 773% 
1,283,672,000 186,092,000 $ 55.50 4.18 $ 13.28 690% 
1,189,374,000 223,058,000 $ 57.30 -4 .36 $ 13.14 533% 
1,354,134,000 219,058,000 $ 53.70 4.52 $ 11.89 618% 
1,408,550,000 368,808,000 $ 52.60 4.60 $ 11.43 382% 
1,490,510,000 421,938,000 $ 61.10 4.77 $ 12.81 353% 
1,561 ,402,000 457,226,000 $ 66.60 4.96 $ 13.41 341% 
1,418,286,000 763,840,000 $ 69.50 5.20 $ 13.36 186% 
1,525,474,000 695,416,000 $ 7-4.60 5.48 $ 13.60 219% 
i ,566,874,000 811,896,000 $ 72.70 5.72 $ i2.72 193% 
1,607,330,000 897,038,000 $ 71 .30 5.89 $ 12.11 179% 
1,588,850,000 850,934,000 $ 72.60 6.07 $ 11 .96 187% 
1,578,716,000 1,062,104,000 $ 66.70 6.23 $ 10.71 149°1< 
1,414,916,000 1,190,768,000 $ 61 .80 6.40 $ 9.66 119o/c 
1,414,054,000 1,222,912,000 $ 58.70 6.61 $ 8.88 116% 
1,409,886,000 1,383,400,000 $ 63.10 6.72 $ 9.39 102% 
Source: Data collected from USDA Annual Statistical Yearbooks. 
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Table 3: Pork data 1949-1997. 
U.S.PORK HEAD tis ts OF #sOF 
YEAR SLAUGHTERED PROCESSED DOMESTIC USE STOCKS 
1949 75293000 10333000000 9993000000 39290200 
1950 79468000 10714000000 10361000000 
1951 85581000 11481000000 10818000000 
1952 86712000 11527000000 11132000000 
1953 74783000 10006000000 9957000000 
1954 72082000 9870000000 9631000000 
1955 81058000 10991000000 10834000000 
1956 85216000 11200000000 11146000000 
1957 79024000 10424000000 10351000000 
1958 77339000 10454000000 10399000000 
1959 87606000 11993000000 11797000000 
1960 84375000 11605000000 11588000000 26428000 
1961 82050000 11411000000 1122900000 22293400 
1962 83579000 11841000000 11685000000 19997400 
1963 87252000 12439000000 12172000000 214083000 
1964 86420000 12523000000 12303000000 27668500 
1965 76394000 11132000000 11226000000 23200800 
1966 75324000 11328000000 11232000000 15188300 
1967 83421000 12572000000 12506000000 22834000 
1968 86401000 13055000000 i 2034000000 28592700 
1969 84958000 12946000000 12938000000 25632300 
1970 86962000 13427000000 13389000000 21093500 
11971 95527000 14783000000 14904000000 33610200 
1972 85669000 13617000000 13907000000 32997400 
1973 7i646000 12751000000 12820000000 21420400 
1974 83085000 13805000000 13962000000 28611000 
1975 69824000 11503000000 11575000000 29438700 
1976 74950000 12415000000 12363000000 23603300 
1977 78442000 13247000000 13200000000 19696800 
1978 78417000 13393000000 13293000000 17400300 
1979 85425000 15450000000 15353000000 22449700 
1980 91882000 16615000000 16562000000 28564500 
1981 92472000 15875000000 15927000000 350805000 
1982 92472000 14229000000 14425000000 247303000 
1983 88101000 15202000000 15436000000 22415300 
1984 85641000 14812000000 15470000000 29511400 
1985 84938000 14805000000 15733000000 29192500 
1986 79956000 14063000000 15008000000 23537900 
1987 81422000 14374000000 15352000000 21773100 
1988 88136000 15684000000 16549000000 29148000 
1989 89007000 15811000000 16571000000 37760500 
1990 85431000 15353000000 16030000000 272491000 
1991 88445000 16000000000 16399000000 24700600 
1992 95157000 17282000000 17474000000 34116900 
1993 93296000 17087000000 17419000000 32948800 
1994 95905000 17697000000 17829000000 34881000 
1995 96535000 17848000000 17768000000 45792800 
1996 92569000 17116000000 16795000000 473084000 
1997 92125000 17275000000 16821000000 414995000 
Source: Data collected from USDA Annual Statistical Yearbooks. 
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Table 4: Pork data (part 2) 1949-1997. 
lsOF HEAD #sOF AVE PRICE AVE. PRICE ADJ. 
EXPORTS IMPORTED IMPORTS /CWT FOR INFLATION 
67305000 S.1000 14470000 $ 18.30 $ 18.30 
66556000 580000 42605000 $ i6.20 $ iS.01 
90908000 755000 53291000 $ 20.00 $ 18.39 
102888000 740000 66139000 $ 17.80 $ 16.00 
86916000 811000 149245000 $ 21.40 $ 19.06 
652.«000 1081000 174940000 $ 21 .60 $ 19.18 
76828000 1273000 167542000 .,. 15.00 $ 13.36 • 
85665000 1383000 144927000 $ 14.40 $ 12.63 
96429000 1482000 148210000 $ 17.80 $ 15.10 
65409000 1907000 324134000 $ 19.60 $ 16.14 
171900000 2348000 273340000 $ 14.10 $ 11 .55 
197800000 2463000 194374000 $ 15.30 $ 12.32 
197959000 2231000 198680000 $ 16.60 $ 13.22 
193557000 2580000 229974000 $ 16.30 $ 12.83 
301868000 2657000 217530000 $ 14.90 $ 11.60 
372070000 2712000 216931000 $ 14.80 $ 11 .37 
2865-41000 2385000 269572000 $ 20.60 $ 15.57 
279461000 2595000 307672000 $ 22.80 $ 16.75 
289187000 2873000 331104000 $ 18.90 $ 13.50 
327740000 3315000 347443000 $ 18.60 $ 12.74 
402803000 3058000 343933000 $ 22.20 $ 14.45 
316832000 3201000 386401000 $ 22.70 $ 13.94 
359152000 3638000 385372000 $ 17.50 $ 10.30 
393272000 3460000 424098000 $ 25.10 $ 14.31 
464042000 4002000 423859000 $ 38.40 $ 20.61 
415589000 4030000 383588000 $ 34.20 $ 16.52 
511992000 3913000 346880000 $ 46.10 $ 20.43 
705317000 4345000 336350000 $ 43.30 $ 18.15 
619704000 4258000 296098000 $ 39.40 $ 15.49 
592900000 4561000 331700000 «' 41 .80 «' 17.03 
547964000 4968000 351916000 $ 38.00 $ 13.72 
590716000 4628000 418680000 $ 43.90 $ 10.99 
645270000 4077000 418636000 $ 52.30 $ 11.51 
617028000 3767000 476940000 $ 46.80 $ 12.92 
592114000 3527000 532036000 $ 47.10 $ 11.20 
551540000 3527000 741396000 $ 44.00 $ 10.80 
591204000 3676000 882602000 $ 49.30 $ 9.74 
568246000 3447000 887830000 $ 51.20 $ 10.72 
646184000 3746000 955738000 $ 42.30 $ 10.74 
895318000 3642000 902618000 $ 42 .50 $ 8.52 
850780000 3642000 722218000 $ 53.70 $ 8.17 
811198000 4308000 717488000 $ 49.10 $ 9.79 
919870000 4670000 652412000 $ 4i.60 $ 8.59 
1046964000 4871000 557366000 $ 45.20 $ 7.06 
1130292000 5675000 648318000 $ 39.90 $ 7.45 
1265270000 6172000 671270000 $ 40.50 $ 6.40 
1608882000 7550000 647256000 $ 51.90 $ 6.33 
1819684000 1041000 610770000 $ 52.90 $ 7.85 
1824194000 14870000 656666000 $ 32.50 $ 7.87 
Sou ice: Data collected from USDA Annual Statistical Yearbooks. 
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Table 5: Wheat data 1949-1997. 
U.S.WHEAT ACRES BUSHELS BUSHELS OF BUSHELS OF BUSHELS OF 
PLANTED PRODUCED DOMESTIC USE ON-FARM STKS OFF-FARM STKS 
1949 84931000 1098415000 732853000 327230000 58199600 
1950 71396000 1019344000 693458000 335670000 66431700 
1951 78048000 988161000 664607000 334518000 51805300 
1952 n441000 1306440000 679640000 399412000 70386300 
1953 76789000 117307,000 603939000 423068000 909,9800 
1954 61971000 983900000 59813-4000 315689000 115016800 
1955 58241000 93-4731000 586236000 318734000 124821600 
1956 60747000 997207000 574451000 292804000 119-446200 
1957 49852000 950662000 575600000 292407000 109025300 
1958 56431000 1462218000 600844000 456581000 136358200 
1959 57722000 1126682000 596325000 329691000 154614000 
1960 55633000 1363443000 603539000 421469000 164596400 
1961 55664000 12347-43000 625586000 359484000 162307900 
1962 49084000 1091787000 582805000 317468000 1500038000 
1963 52989000 1142013000 579159000 309694000 130408800 
1964 55046000 1290458000 643500000 390126000 105962100 
1965 57361000 1315613000 731200000 405314000 93067600 
1966 54513000 1310642000 679300000 408733000 64000900 
1967 67796000 1522382000 647800000 507611000 70449000-
1968 62595000 1570433000 753900000 580025000 76425100 
1969 54279000 1460187000 791200000 611116000 92337500 
11970 49558000 1378465000 768600000 535651000 88373700 1971 53810000 161n89000 854700000 694191000 88387800 
1972 54942000 154-4n5000 784600000 507332000 85310000 
1973 58978000 1705167000 751300000 363323000 56395200 
1974 71169000 1793322000 686000000 440196000 65961300 
1975 75078000 2134833000 735000000 546613000 83797800 
1976 80215000 2147408000 748000000 663764000 111637600 
1977 75119000 2036318000 849000000 831294000 116245900 
1978 66094000 1798712000 838000000 815447000 81636400 
1979 71424000 2134060000 783000000 773920000 124074500 
1980 80430000 2369666000 776000000 754089000 149657400 
1981 88928000 2798738000 854000000 955579000 1222428000 
1982 87277000 2808737000 870000000 1166084000 135446500 
1983 76419000 2419824000 1111000000 1015409000 131096400 
1984 79213000 2594777000 1154000000 930281000 1210750000 
1985 75585000 2425105000 1045000000 1011203000 151496400 
1986 72068000 2091635000 1193000000 794000000 145643000 
1987 65829000 2107685000 1086000000 748000000 117553600 
1988 65529000 1812201000 975000000 463000000 76471100 
1989 76615000 2036618000 992000000 376000000 567109000 
1990 77286000 2738594000 1379000000 532920000 86305700 
1991 69881000 1980139000 1132000000 277550000 614425000 
1992 722i9000 2466798000 1128000000 378000000 67029100 
1993 72168000 2396440000 1240000000 363200000 664787000 
1994 70349000 2322552000 1287000000 335250000 63382300 
1995 69031000 2182708000 1140000000 220550000 602914000 
1996 75105000 2277388000 1301000000 320750000 50106900 
1997 70412000 2481466000 1257000000 399920000 76664400 
Source: Data collected from USDA Annual Statistical Yearbooks. 
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Table 6: Corn data 1949-1997. 
U.S.CORN ACRES BUSHELS BUSHELS OF BUSHELS OF BUSHELS OF 
YEAR PLANTED PRODUCED DOMESTIC USE ON-FARM STKS OFF-FARM STKS 
1949 87910000 2946206000 3238222000 2547912000 9341800 
1950 84370000 2764071000 3054550000 2405778000 40045100 
1951 83283000 2628937000 3076613000 2106698000 50380000 
1952 82658000 2980793000 2857679000 1892173000 46520000 
1953 61730000 2661801000 2946480000 2154757000 40370400" 
1954 81893000 2707913000 2841253000 2144305000 53775700 
1955 81097000 2883682000 2980318000 2116728000 73204300 
1956 78557000 3081097000 3018308000 2214697000 86731300 
1957 73947000 3072913000 3173872000 2338970000 107884300 
1958 74654000 3441627000 3511832000 2468049000 1143158000 
1959 84390000 4281316000 3795673000 2696999000 122986700 
1960 82906000 4352668000 3395778000 3031325000 136205100 
1961 66771000 3625530000 3561113000 3o.6724000 164057300 
1962 65984000 3643615000 3515669000 3021630000 147293900 
1963 69995000 4091685000 3427740000 2964921000 125174800 
1964 57393000 3548504000 3305000000 3247553000 113636400v 
1965 65119000 4084342000 3705000000 2737488000 113739200 
1966 66255000 4103323000 3648000000 3084863000 95647500 
1967 71093000 4760076000 3804000000 2898768000 77861900-
1968 64787000 4374840000 3907000000 3391263000 86606100 
1969 64476000 4582534000 4086000000 3276322000 957050000 
1970 67171000 4109792000 3977000000 3323278000 99313700 
1971 74055000 5641112000 4387000000 2755112000 101347900 
1972 66753000 5553061000 4733000000 3551121000 114908400 
1973 71912000 5646806000 4631000000 3689125000 114145500 
1974 77746000 4651167000 3641000000 3356932000 111642400 
1975 78166000 5797048000 4049000000 3179209000 108002400 
1976 84121000 6216032000 4100000000 3316972000 126936400 
1977 83568000 6425457000 4260000000 3345496000 154402300 
1978 79719000 7081849000 4943000000 3824347000 167897800 
1979 81393000 7938819000 5194000000 4637665000 168148300 
1980 84106000 6647534000 4850000000 5041691000 184448400 
1981 84156000 8201598000 4984000000 4141465000 171730900 
1982 81909000 8397334000 5200000000 5033830000 193382600 
1983 60217000 4174678000 4793000000 5935986000 226870600 
1984 80543000 7674020000 5171000000 3079963000 183290400 
1985 83448000 8876706000 5255000000 4304054000 156017100 
1986 76674000 8249864000 5906000000 5528606000 236616200 
1987 66200000 7131300000 6041000000 5024000000 322419300 
1988 67717000 4928681000 5232000000 4421000000 321459000 
1989 72221000 7525-493000 5745000000 3021000000 218292600 
1990 74171000 7933068000 6180000000 2910500000 190192100 
1991 75957000 7474765000 6331000000 3064500000 172447400 
1992 79311000 8476698000 6808000000 2610200000 195076500 
1993 73235000 6336470000 6292000000 3630000000 204821500 
1994 79175000 10102735000 7205000000 2210200000 178551400 
1995 71479000 7400051000 6320000000 3502000000 2089693000 
1996 79229000 9232557000 6994000000 2000200000 179934100 
1997 79537000 9206832000 7287000000 2870000000 162412800 
Source: Data collected from USDA Annual Statistical Yearbooks. 
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Table 8: Soybean data 1949-1997. 
U.S. SOYBEANS ACRES BUSHELS BUSHELS OF BUSHELS OF BUSHELS OF 
YEAR PLANTED PRODUCED DOMESTIC USE ON-FARM STKS OFF-FARM STK 
1949 12082000 234194000 218001000 75504000 10717300 
1950 15408000 299249000 270201000 60853000 
1951 15735000 2837TTOOO 266016000 101728000 
1952 16136000 298839000 259584000 104167000 
1953 16792000 269169000 237850000 83621000 14262900 
1954 19253000 341075000 271853000 81599000 10868800 
1955 19959000 373522000 312259000 148345000 11095100 
1956 22259000 455869000 357919000 116602000 15816900 
1957 22149000 483715000 387022000 167046000 16030700 
1958 25133000 574413000 428607000 189935000 19209900 
1959 23407000 533175000 430937000 201993000 26933600 
1960 24463000 558TT8000 442471000 196222000 25567700 
1961 27981000 679566000 474841000 171936000 2494530 
1962 28848000 675197000 531374000 258403000 26216800 
1963 29598000 699363000 491356000 226552000 30328200 
1964 31794000 599882000 529507000 251337000 29751000 
1965 35227000 845608000 589506000 190728000 33482000 
1966 37388000 931491000 612392000 284310000 33455400 
1967 40776000 976060000 633053000 34-4394000 37704100 
1968 41579000 1079662000 658261000 350634000 43233300 
1969 42198000 1126314000 791948000 409127000 54777900 
11
970 43332000 1135769000 824356000 371510000 68342500 
1971 43472000 1175989000 7859TTOOO 391960000 55301200 
972 47003000 1282935000 803514000 397605000 49138700 
1973 56675000 1547165000 896791000 429071000 43792400 
1974 53580000 1233425000 779946000 608160000 55275600 
1975 54732000 1546120000 931426000 483869000 50539200 
1976 50327000 1264890000 865512000 589303000 66540800 
1977 58760000 1761755000 1003144000 672861000 559045000 
r78 6-4-044000 1S42""o47000 1104820000 689856000 65240000 1979 71632000 2267901000 1208382000 699556000 69253400 
1980 70087000 1817097000 1109493000 892934000 87789600 
1981 67810000 2000145000 1122677000 730157000 79030000 
1982 72162000 2276976000 1194986000 888184000 74318800 
1983 63TT9000 1635772000 1061950000 1008139000 75456000 
1984 67755000 1860863000 1122328000 620171000 67038400 
1985 63130000 2098531000 1137551000 766335000 655724000 
1986 60385000 1940101000 1283075000 
1987 58180000 1937722000 1255047000 589000000 749958000 
1988 58840000 1548841000 1142268000 553100000 594620000 
1989 60820000 1923566000 1245164000 415000000 47524600 
1990 57795000 1921787000 1282221000 535800000 51970500 
1991 59180000 1986539000 1356645000 505000000 67234300 
1992 59180000 2190354000 1408989000 576900000 63866700 
1993 60135000 1870958000 1371477000 425700000 59591700 
1994 61670000 2516694000 1558350000 635300000 73489800 
1995 62495000 2174254000 1478887000 512000000 67835600 
1996 64195000 2380274000 1558957000 514000000 54175400 
1997 70005000 2688750000 1755429000 637000000 56592200 
Source: Data collected from USDA Annual Statistical Yearbooks. 
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